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CIGNA HEAL THPLAN OFLOUISIANA, INC. V LOUISIANA:
UNWILLING TO SAVE LOUISIANA'S ANY WILLING
PROVIDER STATUTE FROM
ERISA PREEMPTION
I.

INTRODUCTION

The health care crisis in the United States continues in the wake of
1
the failure of President Clinton's much-trumpeted Health Security Act.
The statistics are staggering. From 1988 to 1992, the increases in expenditures for health care were in the "double-digit [s] and near-doubledigit[s]."2 In 1994, the latest year for which data has been calculated,
1. H.R. 3600, S. 1757, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). On November 20, 1993,
President Clinton introduced the Health Security Act. He had one hundred cosponsors of the bill in the House of Representatives and thirty in the Senate. See
Gary A. Francesconi, Note, ERISA Preemption of "Any Willing Provider"Laws-an Essential Step Toward National Health Care Reform, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 227, 228 n.5
(1995) (describing introduction of Health Security Act into Congress) (citing
Steven Findlay, Jockeyingfor Position, Bus. & HEALTH, Jan. 1994, at 18). At the end
of the term of the 103rd Congress, however, President Clinton and other Democratic leaders announced that the health care bills could not withstand Republican
opposition. See id. (stating that demise of health care bill was result of Democrats'
failure to get votes necessary to stop promised Republican-led Senate filibuster on
any health care bill proposed by Democrats and citing Dana Priest, Democrats Pull
the Plug on Health Care Reform, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 1994, at Al). As a result,
Congress never voted on the health care bill. See id. (describing failure of Congress to even vote on health care bill as "anticlimactic finale to 21 months of national debate" over health care reform and citing Dana Priest & Michael
Weisskopf, Health Care Reform: The Collapse of a Quest; Clinton's Top Domestic Priority
Succumbed to Miscalculation,Aggressive Opposition and Partisanship,WASH. POST, Oct.
11, 1994, at A6). For an overview of the Clinton Health Care Plan as proposed
during the 1992 presidential campaign, see Bill Clinton, The Clinton Health Care
Plan, 327 NEW ENG. J. MED. 804, 804 (1992) (identifying problems with present
system and proposing plan for reform); see also Robert Pear, Clinton's Health Plan:
The Overview; Congress is Given Clinton Proposalfor Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28,
1993, at Al (detailing certain aspects of Clinton health care plan).
2. Spencer Rich, Rise in Health Care Spending Slows; Lowest Growth Rate in Three
Decades Tied to HMOs, Low Inflation,WASH. PosT, May 28, 1996, at A9. After years of
dramatic increases, national health care spending rose only 6.4% in 1994. See id.
The Medicare Office of National Health Statistics reported that this was the slowest
growth rate recorded in more than thirty years. See id. This slow growth rate was
attributable to employers switching coverage for their employees from conventional "fee-for-service" plans to less expensive health maintenance organizations
(HMOs) and other managed-care plans. See id. (noting that low rate of inflation
also contributed to slower increase in spending).
Some commentators and politicians believe that these statistics support the
argument that increasing competition i n the health industry is cutting down on
waste and limiting cost growth. See id. (citing to arguments from health analysts
and GOP members of Congress that competition in health care industry pushes
costs down). Representative Nancy L. Johnson (R-Conn.) stated that these figures
demonstrate that, in the private sector, "'managed care and competition are lower-
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health expenditures totaled $949.4 billion, or 13.7% of the gross domestic
product. 3 Although some commentators suggest that health care spending has leveled off, the Department of Labor announced in February 1996
that the cost of medical care rose by 3.9% in 1995, a rate well above the
general rate of inflation. 4 In addition, the American Hospital Association
recently announced that, by 2002, seven million more Americans will not
have health insurance, bringing the total number of uninsured to forty-six
5
million.
6
These statistics demonstrate the acute need for health care reform.
Despite the lack of comprehensive national health care reform, many
ing the rate of cost increases in health care.'" Id. (quoting Representative
Johnson).
3. See id. (stating that expenditures are $3510 for each person in United States
and noting that health care spending in United States accounts for greater proportion of gross domestic product than in any other developed nation).
4. See Stephen E. Winn, The Health Care Crisis, Continued, KAN. CrrY STAR, Feb.
4, 1996, at J2 (reporting cost of medical care rose at rate higher than inflation).
Although the increase in health care spending in 1995 was the smallest in decades,
the health care statistics are still cause for concern. See id. (explaining that decreases in health care spending do not necessarily warrant optimism). For example, there are some troubling considerations: the statistics do not fully account for
reductions in medical coverage by businesses and health insurance companies;
some of the savings from managed care are the result of cost shifting when medical
providers raise prices on other patients to compensate for the discounts demanded
by managed-care systems; and some employers are considering reducing or eliminating coverage for future retirees. See id. (explaining factors for which lower
health care spending statistics do not account).
5. See Robert A. Rosenblatt, Number of Americans Lacking Health Insurance On
Rise; Benefits: Now 15.1 % Are Without Medical Coverage and the Figure Is Expected to
Climb to 16.2% by 2002, Study Finds. Shifts In Economy Are Blamed, L.A. TIMES, Sept.
11, 1996, at A21 (reporting statistics from American Hospital Association report
and stating that percentage of those without health insurance, 15.1% in 1996, will
climb to 16.2% over next six years).
According to the study, the proportion of U.S. employees and their family
members covered by health insurance peaked at 77% in 1990. See id. Since 1990,
that figure has steadily decreased to 73.9% in 1995. See id. According to the
study's predictions, the coverage rate will fall to 70.4% by 2002. See id.
The rising number of uninsured Americans is partly attributable to shifts in
the economy. See id. (stating that changes in manufacturing and service industries
have impacted number of uninsured Americans). The economy is growing rapidly
in the service sector, where companies are less likely to offer health insurance. See
id. Conversely, the economy is shrinking in the manufacturing sector, reducing
the number of union-dominated industries that have traditionally provided health
insurance coverage. See id.
In addition, many companies are increasingly using outside contractors for
many jobs. See id. Often, these contractors do not provide health care coverage
for their employees. See id. The American Hospital Association report also stated
that some employers are reducing or eliminating coverage for employees who retire early. See id.
6. See MAKING HEALTH REFORM WORK: THE VIEW FROM THE STATES 1 (John J.
Dilulio, Jr. & Richard R. Nathan eds., 1994) [hereinafter MAKING HEALTH REFORM
WORK] (stating that two fundamental truths have emerged about health care finance in United States: "First, the system is in bad shape. Some citizens have no
health insurance at all, while others with insurance have a difficult time negotiat-

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol42/iss4/4

2

Donnelly: CIGNA Healthplan of Louisiana, Inc. v. Louisiana: Unwilling to Sa

1997]

NoTE

1257

states have increased their initiatives in this area. 7 One of the hurdles
that states face, however, is the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (ERISA). 8 ERISA's broad preemption provision thwarts many
ing the system. Second, costs are spiraling and rules are choking the management
of health care finance. Reform is needed."); see also 142 CONG. REC. S371 (1996)
(statement of Sen. Kassebaum) ("The health insurance problem is not merely one
of perception. The number of uninsured and underinsured Americans continues
to climb."); Mary Anne Bobinski, Unhealthy Federalism: Barriers to IncreasingHealth
Care Access for the Uninsured, 24 U.C. DAvIs L. REv. 255, 258 (1990) (stating that
health care system in United States is "plagued with serious distributional inequalities that prevent some from securing access to health care" and that "[d]espite
widespread public dissatisfaction with the current system, politicians have rejected
a radical restructuring of it").
7. See MAMNG HEALTH REFORM WORK, supra note 6, at 17 ("Every state is wresding, with varying speed and success, to initiate reforms to meet state needs.");
HENRY

H.

PERRITT, JR., HEALTH CARE LEGISLATION UPDATE AND ANALYSIS

§§ 5.18-

5.28 (1995) (analyzing reform plans of California, Florida, Hawaii, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee and Washington); see also
Margaret M. Keefe, Three States Focus on Reform at Home, 48 EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLAN
REv. 38 (1993) (summarizing state health care reform proposals in Colorado, Minnesota and Vermont); Walter E. Schuler, Note, The ERISA Pre-emption Narrows:
Analysis of New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Company and Its Impact on State Regulation of Health Care, 40 ST. Louis
U. LJ. 783, 785 (1996) (stating that state legislatures of every state except Nevada
and Wyoming considered proposals to change health care financing and delivery
in their respective states).
Many reform advocates believe that the problems facing the health care system cannot wait for federal action. See Catherine L. Fisk, The Last Article About the
Language of ERISA Preemption?A Case Study of the Failureof Textualism, 33 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 35, 35 (1996) (stating that future of health care reform, if it has any, lies
with states); Wendy E. Parmet, Regulation and Federalism: Legal Impediments to State
Health Care Reform, 19 AM. J.L. & MED. 121, 121 (1993) (finding that because "the
problems facing the health care system cannot wait for federal action [,]" states are
addressing these problems). Rather, these reformers assert that the states are better suited to the task. See id. at 122. The states have been described as
"'laborator[ies]' for 'social and economic experiment,'" closer to the people and,
therefore, more likely to be effective in handling many social problems. Id. (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)).
8. See Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 832 (1974) (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994)) (regulating pension plans and providing protections
to plan participants). President Gerald Ford signed ERISA into law on Labor Day
of 1974. See David L. Gregory, A Symposium Conference Upon the Twentieth Anniversary
of ERISA: Introductory Remarks, 68 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 317, 317 (1994). The final
version of ERISA was the culmination of various pension retirement security initiatives begun by the Eisenhower administration and continued through the Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon administrations. See id. at 317-18 (explaining pre-ERISA
development in pension retirement security).
For a detailed treatment of ERISA, see BARBARA J. COLEMAN, PRIMER ON EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT (3d ed. 1989) (summarizing major provisions of ERISA); RONALD J. COOKE, ERISA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1995)
(discussing coverage and scope of ERISA, procedural and participation requirements and many other aspects of statute); ERISA: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE (Martin
Wald & David E..Kenty eds., 1991) (analyzing statutory provisions and their practical application); JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION & BENEFIT LAw (2d
ed. 1995) (discussing origins and enforcement of ERISA law).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1997

3

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 4 [1997], Art. 4

1258

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42: p. 1255

state health care reform efforts by effectively preventing states from exercising their police powers and generally interfering with their ability to
establish comprehensive health care policies. 9 The far-reaching effects of
9. See 120 CONG. REC. 29197 (1974) (statement of Rep. Dent) (discussing intended scope of ERISA preemption). Representative Dent emphasized the significance of the preemption clause:
I wish to make note of what is to many the crowning achievement of this
legislation, the reservation to Federal authority the sole power to regulate
the field of employee benefit plans. With the preemption of the field, we
round out the protection afforded participants by eliminating the threat
of conflicting and inconsistent State and local regulation.
Id.
As Representative Dent observed, Congress included in ERISA broad preemption provisions that were originally intended to eliminate a patchwork of state regulation in favor of a uniform body of federal law governing pension plans. See New
York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514
U.S. 645, 657 (1995) ("The basic thrust of the pre-emption clause ...was to avoid
a multiplicity of regulation in order to permit the nationally uniform administration of employee benefit plans."); FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 58 (1990)
(holding that preemption clause "establishes as an area of exclusive federal concern the subject of every state law that 'relate [s]to' an employee benefit plan governed by ERISA"); Fort Halifax Packing Co., Inc. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 9-11 (1987)
(finding that Congress intended ERISA preemption to assure uniform regulation
of benefit plans, which would minimize inefficiencies when plans administer benefits in more than one state); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S.
724, 739 (1985) ("The pre-emption provision was intended to displace all state
laws that fall within its sphere, even including state laws that are consistent with
ERISA's substantive requirements."); Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S.
504, 523 (1981) (finding that Congress "meant to establish pension plan regulation as exclusively a federal concern"); Daniel A. Engel, ERISA: Where's the Preemption Now?, 27 TORT & INS. L.J. 523, 524 (1992) (stating that primary purpose of
ERISA is uniformity in employee benefit plan laws through comprehensive preemption provisions that oust all state laws relating to such plans).
These preemption provisions, however, have had a disastrous effect on state
health care reform legislation. See Parmet, supra note 7, at 132-33 ("Medicare and
Medicaid present practical and financial impediments to state health care reforms,
but ERISA forms the major legal barrier.... The impact of ERISA preemption on
state health policy became apparent in the late 1970s as state laws mandating benefits in health insurance policies were challenged."); see also Bobinski, supra note 6,
at 274 ("In the context of state level efforts to improve access to health care....
ERISA's preemption doctrine can be... accurately termed a disaster."); Vicki Gotdich, ERISA Preemption: A Stumbling Block to State Health Care Reform, 26 CLEAINCHOUSE REv. 1469, 1469 (1993) (noting that ERISA preemption bars many state
reform efforts); James E. Holloway, ERISA, Preemption and Comprehensive Federal
Health Care: A Callfor "CooperativeFederalism" to Preserve the States' Role in Formulating
Health Care Policy, 16 CAMPBELL L. REv. 405, 439 (1994) (finding that although
ERISA exempts some areas from preemption, these exemptions "do not give states
the flexibility to broadly formulate health care policy");Jolee Ann Hancock, Comment, Diseased Federalism: State Health Care Laws Fall Prey to ERISA Preemption, 25
CUMB. L. Rev. 383, 383 (1995) (stating that ERISA has had "disastrous" effect on
state health care reform).
In one commentator's opinion, ERISA's preemption of state laws to insure
uniform regulation of benefit plans at the federal level is justifiable, but preemption of state level solutions to the health care crisis in the absence of federal substantive regulation is "a perverse obstacle to improving access to health care for
millions of the uninsured." Bobinski, supra note 6, at 274-75. The magnitude of

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol42/iss4/4

4

Donnelly: CIGNA Healthplan of Louisiana, Inc. v. Louisiana: Unwilling to Sa
1997]

NoTE

1259

ERISA preemption led one commentator to remark that ERISA is the "law
that ate health care reform." 10
the obstacles that ERISA creates for state health care reformers was clear from the
comments at the National Governors' Association's annual meeting in 1994. See
Jesselyn Alicia Brown, Note, ERISA and State Health Care Reform: Roadblock or Scapegoat?, 13 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 339, 342 (1995) (noting comments of conference
participants). One participant remarked that
[r] ather than encouraging state experimentation with new approaches to
health care delivery, [ERISA] is likely to stifle innovation. ...If Congress
does not enact a comprehensive universal federal program, it is only
through relief from ERISA that states can regulate insurance markets and
delivery systems to achieve equity in coverage and financing.
PATRICIA

A.

BUTLER, NAT'L

GovERNoRs'

Ass'N, ROADBLOCK TO REFORM:

ERISA IM-

33 (1994).
Another commentator, however, has suggested that ERISA is not a roadblock
to state health care reform, but a "scapegoat," and that in many cases, states do not
need explicit legislative relief from ERISA to implement health care reforms. See
id. at 344 (stating that "ERISA preemption is not as stifling to reform as many state
policymakers believe" and that "ERISA does ... allow states substantial flexibility to
enact health reform initiatives"). This is not the prevailing view, though. Rather,
most commentators believe that the states are "powerless to act unless Congress
grants so-called 'ERISA waivers.' That is, in order for states to have authority to
reform private health care payment systems, Congress must amend section 514(a)
of... [ERISA], which broadly preempts state laws that 'relate to' employee benefit
plans." Fisk, supra note 7, at 35.
10. Nina Martin, ERISA: The Law That Ate Health Care Reform, CAL. LAw., May
1993, at 40 (explaining how "a pension reform law from the early '70s helped
create America's health care nightmare"). Another commentator noted that the
courts' broad interpretation of ERISA in the last ten years has contributed to the
health care problem. See Karen A. Jordan, Travelers Insurance: New Support for the
Argument to Restrain ERISA Pre-emption, 13 YALE J. ON REG. 255, 257 (1996)
("[C]ourts have gradually interpreted and applied ERISA in a manner that affects
numerous aspects of the health care system. In particular, during the last decade
serious obstacles for health care consumers have arisen as a result of broader application of ERISA's pre-emption provisions.").
Other commentators have also criticized ERISA and its preemption provisions
in particular. See Bobinski, supra note 6, at 274-75 (stating that ERISA creates
.perverse obstacles" to health care access and preempts many state attempts to
regulate employee health plans); Jay Conison, ERISA and the Language of Preemption, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 619, 620 (1994) ("[I]f the language of [the preemption
clause] was truly chosen to prevent litigation over the scope and meaning of the
clause, Congress badly missed the mark."); Fisk, supra note 7, at 38 ("It is a rich
irony that ERISA, which was heralded at its
enactment as significant federal protective legislation, has through its preemption provision been the basis for invalidating scores of progressive state laws."); Leon E. Irish & Harrison J. Cohen, ERISA
Preemption:JudicialFlexibility and Statutory Rigidity, 19 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM 109, 110
(1985) ("[I]t is clear that the inclusion of [ERISA's preemption provision] was a
mistake. Given well-established judicial doctrines of preemption, [this provision]
was unnecessary."); Jordan, supra, at 271 ("ERISA's negative impact on the health
care system has become intolerable."); WilliamJ. Kilberg & Paul D. Inman, Preemption of State Laws Relating to Employee Benefit Plans:An Analysis of ERISA Section 514,
62 TEX. L. REv. 1313, 1316 (1984) (finding that ERISA preemption clause provides
little guidance in determining whether state law "relates to" employee benefit
plans); Paul O'Neil, ProtectingERISA Health Care Claimants:PracticalAssessment of a
Neglected Issue in Health Care Reform, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 723, 723-24 (1994) (observing
that although Congress intended to protect participants in employee benefit plans
PLICATIONS FOR STATE HEALTH CARE INITIATVEs
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Because of wide-ranging precedent affirming the strength of ERISA's
preemption clause, state lawmakers' freedom to enact new health care legislation is extremely limited." Several options exist, however, to facilitate
state health care reform.
One option is to repeal or amend the ERISA preemption provisions
to allow for more state regulation of health care. 12 Another way some
states are trying to overcome ERISA preemption is by obtaining an ERISA
when it enacted ERISA, ERISA is now used as "shield for employers, insurance
companies, and plan administrators, rather than to protect participants' rights");
Nicole Weisenborn, ERISA Preemption and Its Effect on State Health Reform, 5 KAN.J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 147, 147 (1995) (stating that "ERISA's broad preemption can have
extremely detrimental effects" on state regulation of health care).
Not all commentary has criticized ERISA preemption, however. One commentator remarked that ERISA is a model of "viable federalism in the employment
law context." David Gregory, The Scope of ERISA Preemption of State Law: A Study in
Effective Federalism, 48 U. Prrr. L. REv. 427, 430 (1987). According to Gregory,
although ERISA preemption of state employee benefit law is "extensive," it "has
been neither absolute nor indiscriminate." Id. at 429. He added that
[t] hrough both case law construction and subsequent enlightened legislative amendments during the past decade, the scope of ERISA preemption
has been periodically recalibrated. These responsible judicial and legislative refinements have preserved ERISA's strong federal primacy in employee pension and welfare benefit law, while simultaneously allowing for

dynamic and flexible state initiatives consonant with ERISA's policy of
protecting and furthering employee pension and welfare benefit plans.
The cumulative result yields a study in Hamiltonian federalism.
Id.
11. See Fisk, supranote 7, at 35 (stating that "the future of health care reform,
if it has any .... lie [s] in the states," but "conventional wisdom is that ... states are
powerless to act unless Congress grants so-called 'ERISA waivers' "); Parmet, supra
note 7, at 122 (stating that legal barriers to state reform are daunting because
values such as federal supremacy and interstate harmony often dominate legal

analysis); Hancock, supra note 9, at 383 (noting that some states have actually en-

acted reform measures, but many of these have been blocked by ERISA's preemption doctrine); Schuler, supra note 7, at 783-84 (stating that ERISA has stood as
"most formidable obstacle to state health care reform efforts with its broad preemption provision"); Weisenborn, supra note 10, at 147 ("[M]any state attempts to
reform health care have failed as federal district and circuit courts apply broad
statutory preemption."). For further discussion of the cases affirming ERISA's
broad preemption, see supra note 9 and accompanying text.
12. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994) (stating that ERISA "supersede[s] any and

all State laws" that relate to employee benefit plans). Narrowing this preemption
clause would allow states to enact their own health care measures.
One way to narrow the preemption language would be to adopt the language
originally proposed in the House of Representatives in 1973. See Fisk, supra note 7,
at 52-53 (discussing scope of preemption under House bill). This version would
have preempted state laws that "'relate to the reporting and disclosure responsibilities and fiduciary responsibilities of persons acting on behalf of' ERISA-covered
plans." Id. (quoting H.R. 2, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973)). The bill also would have
preempted state laws that "'relate to' funding and benefits-vesting provisions of
pension plans." Id. at 53. If the preemption clause were narrowed in this manner,
ERISA would preempt only those laws that directly conflict with ERISA's substantive regulatory provision; therefore, some state health care reform measures would
escape preemption. See id. at 52-53 (discussing Supreme Court's recognition that
early versions of ERISA tied scope of preemption to scope of ERISA regulation).
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waiver. 13 Finally, the judiciary can save health care reform legislation
Another legislative option would be to expand the savings clause to exempt
more state legislation from preemption or to repeal or limit the deemer clause.
The deemer clause prescribes which entities can qualify for an exemption to preemption under the insurance savings clause. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2) (B) (1994)
(limiting those entities that can be considered insurers within ERISA). By repealing or limiting the deemer clause, more entities would qualify for the insurance
savings clause and would escape preemption.
This would not be an easy task, however, given the usual political gridlock in
Congress. See Devon P. Groves, ERISA Waivers and State Health Care Reform, 28
COLUM.J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 609, 635 (1995) ("Various proposals have arisen in Congress to lessen the preemptive bite of ERISA for state health care reform efforts.
The greatest commonality among these proposals is that they have all failed miserably."). Despite the failure of various reform efforts, there appears to be some
support for ERISA reform, especially from representatives and senators from states
that wish to enact health care reform legislation. See id. at 635-48 (discussing reform proposals sponsored by various senators and representatives). In the past,
ERISA reform efforts were often opposed because of the view that national health
care reform was a better alternative. See id. at 630 ("Until recently, the potential
for ERISA reform was subsumed by the broader political agenda of national health
care."). Now that national health care reform has stalled, there is perhaps more
hope for ERISA reforms that would allow states to experiment with their own
health care initiatives. See id. (stating that "chances of ERISA reform may be
greater since the political focus has shifted away from a national solution," therefore, making Congress more likely to allow states to act).
There is still considerable opposition to amendments that would limit the
scope of ERISA preemption, however. Employers and employee benefit plan administrators are likely to oppose any attempt to narrow the preemption clause because they usually find preemption of state regulation desirable. See HENRY H.
PERRITr, JR., State Health Care Reform and ERISA Preemption, in WILEY EMPLOYMENT
LAw UPDATE 346 (Henry H. Perritt, Jr. ed., 1995) (noting that if state regulation is
preempted, plans and their employer sponsors have greater flexibility in designing
and administering their health care plans). On the other hand, state lawmakers
and plan claimants generally wish to avoid ERISA preemption because state health
care reform provisions are more likely to favor claimants than are the corresponding ERISA provisions. See id. Even if employer interest groups manage to successfully lobby against amending the ERISA preemption language, other options exist
to loosen the grip of ERISA preemption, as this Note suggests.
This Note advocates that the courts narrow their interpretation of the preemption language. This would allow states to begin their reform efforts without
awaiting legislative action to amend ERISA. Other commentators agree that the
best approach to reformulating ERISA preemption is to encourage the judiciary to
narrow its interpretation of the preemption provisions. SeeJordan, supra note 10,
at 260 ("[L]egislative modifications ...are unlikely .... It is therefore up to the
judiciary to develop sound doctrines that ensure that ERISA pre-emption is kept
within the bounds that Congress intended in 1974.").
13. See generally Fisk, supra note 7, at 35 n.1 (defining ERISA waivers). An
ERISA waiver is an "amendment to the ERISA preemption provision to eliminate
preemption of state law in a particular circumstance," as opposed to a general
amendment of the preemption language. Id. For a detailed discussion of the potential role of ERISA waivers in the future of state health care reform, see Groves,
supra note 12 (examining impact of ERISA on state health care reform efforts and
proposals before Congress for waivers).
Such a waiver would permit states to regulate directly or indirectly employee
benefit plans in a particular way. So far, only Hawaii has been successful at obtaining an ERISA waiver. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b) (5) (A) (1994) (stating that preemption clause "shall not apply to the Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act"). This
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from preemption by reinterpreting the preemption provisions in a way
that enables states to achieve health care reform without sacrificing the
original goals of ERISA. 14 The Supreme Court has already taken a step in
this direction with its decision in New York State Conference of Blue Cross &
Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co.

15

Despite the Travelers decision, courts continue to broadly construe the
preemption language to defeat state health care reform measures. In
CIGNA Healthplan of Louisiana,Inc. v. Louisiana,1 6 the United States Court

of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit invalidated a Louisiana statute that required preferred provider organizations to accept into their networks any
health care provider willing to meet the terms and conditions of the preferred provider organization (PPO).17 This decision, besides creating an
waiver exempts the Hawaii Prepaid Health Care -Act ("Hawaii Act") from pieemption, but preempts amendments of the Hawaii Act "to the extent [they] provide[ ]
for more than the effective administration of such Act." Id. § 1144(b) (5) (B) (ii);
see Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act, HAw.Rv. STAT. § 393 (1993). Prior to the
enactment of this waiver, the Ninth Circuit had held that ERISA preempted the
Hawaii Act. See Standard Oil Co. v. Agsalud, 633 F.2d 760, 765-66 (9th Cir. 1980)
(finding ERISA preemption language broad enough to encompass Hawaii Act),
affd, 454 U.S. 801 (1981).
14. See Jordan, supra note 10, at 260 (stating that it is up to judiciary to de-

velop sound doctrines that ensure ERISA preemption is kept within limits that
Congress intended in 1974); Weisenborn, supra note 10, at 157 (stating that
Supreme Court's traditional interpretation stifles state health care regulation so
"when the Court grants certiorari to its next ERISA preemption case, political reality demands a change in ...interpretation of ERISA preemption").
15. 514 U.S. 645 (1995). In Travelers, the Court held that ERISA does not
preempt a New York statute that requires hospitals to collect surcharges from patients insured by a commercial insurer, but not from patients covered by a Blue
Cross/Blue Shield plan. Id. at 658-62. Narrowly construing the "relate to" clause
of ERISA's preemption provision, the Court held that the surcharge provisions do
not have a sufficient "connection with" employee benefit plans within the meaning
of ERISA and, therefore, are saved from preemption. See id. at 662. The Court
explained that cost uniformity was not an object of preemption and that a law's
indirect economic effect on the cost of various health insurance packages are a "far
cry" from the "'conflicting directives'" from which Congress intended to insulate
ERISA plans. See id.
16. 82 F.3d 642 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 387 (1996).
17. Id. at 650. The Fifth Circuit held that ERISA preempted Louisiana's Any
Willing Provider Statute "as it relates to third party administrators and health care
plans that provide services to ERISA-qualified benefit plans." See id. Many states'
preferred provider organization (PPO) statutes include an "any willing provider"
requirement. See James C. Deschene, Preferred Provider Organization, in HEALTH
CARE CoRPoRATE LAw: MANAGED CARE 2-46 (Mark A. Hall & William S. Brewbaker,
III eds., 1996) ("Any willing provider requirements have been included in the PPO
laws of a significant number of states."). At least twenty-five states have enacted
some form of "any willing provider" statutes. See Angela Mickelson et al., Managed
CarePotpourriII: What's New in the Regulatory Market, 16 WHITrIER L. REv. 1005, 1017
(1995) (stating that "any willing provider" laws are most popular of antimanaged
care legislative efforts). These laws require PPOs to include in their networks all
providers willing to accept the terms and conditions the PPOs offer to providers.
See Deschene, supra, at 2-46 to 2-47 (discussing requirement to include all providers but finding unpersuasive justification for such requirement).
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apparent circuit split,18 demonstrates the magnitude of the obstacles that
states face when attempting to implement health care reform legislation.
This Note suggests that, in the absence of legislative action, courts
should narrowly construe the ERISA preemption language to accommodate state health care reform legislation.' 9 Part II of this Note briefly explains ERISA's preemption doctrine. 20 Part III discusses the Supreme
Court's decision in Travelers as a turning point in the Court's analysis of
ERISA preemption. 2 ' Finally, Part IV addresses the Fifth Circuit's recent
application of the preemption precedent in CIGNA Healthplan and advocates that the Fifth Circuit should have followed the lead of the Travelers
Court and narrowed its interpretation of ERISA preemption, particularly
22
the "relate to" clause.
These laws have been controversial. Generally, "any willing provider" legislation has been supported by provider groups "who fear that substantial numbers of
providers will be arbitrarily cut out of PPO networks." Id. at 2-47. In their amicus
brief in CIGNA Healthplan, the Louisiana State Medical Society and the Louisiana
Dental Association stated that they "strongly endorse and support ["any willing

provider" statutes], as [they] directly and tangibly serve[

the public interest of

assuring access to quality medical and dental care and freedom of health care provider choice." Brief of Amicus Curiae for Louisiana State Medical Society and the

Louisiana Dental Association in Support of Appellants at 1, CIGNA Healthplan(No.
95-30481). Those opposed to "any willing provider" statutes have argued that "any
willing provider" laws could seriously undermine a provider network's ability to
exclude "competent, yet lower quality, physicians." See Karen A. Jordan, Managed
Competition and Limited Choice of Providers: CounteringNegative Perceptions Through a
Responsibility to Select Quality Network Physicians, 27 ARiz. ST. L.J. 875, 915 (1995)
[hereinafter Jordan, Managed Competition] (stating that "any willing provider" laws,
because they undermine ability to exclude competent, yet lower quality physicians,
"constitute a clear barrier to quality-focused selective contracting of network physicians"); see also Christine C. Dodd, Comment, The Exclusion of Non-Physician HealthCare ProvidersFrom IntegratedDelivery Systems: Group Boycott or Legitimate Business Practice?, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 983, 989 (1996) (stating that "any willing provider" laws

destroy HMOs' competitive advantage and, in particular, their ability to selectively

contract).
This Note does not evaluate the desirability of enacting "any willing provider"
laws. Rather, it merely addresses a state's ability to enact this type of legislation
and similar health care reform measures given the current interpretation of ERISA
preemption.
18. See Stuart Circle Hosp. Corp. v. Aetna Health Management, 995 F.2d 500,
505 (4th Cir. 1993) (sparing similar "any willing provider" statute from preemption). The Stuart Circle court held that, although the statute fell within the preemption provision of ERISA, the savings clause exempted the statute from
preemption. Id.
19. For a discussion of the narrow construction of ERISA preemption which
this Note suggests that courts adopt, see infra notes 146-86 and accompanying text.
20. For a discussion of ERISA's preemption doctrine, see infra notes 23-98
and accompanying text.
21. For a discussion of the Travelers decision, see infra notes 80-96 and accompanying text.
22. For a discussion of the Fifth Circuit's recent application of the preemption precedent, see infra notes 97-145 and accompanying text.
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BACKGROUND

Commentators have remarked that "ERISA is one of the most difficult
areas of the law to understand, let alone master." 23 Congress enacted this
complex and comprehensive legislation to protect the rights of employees
who earn pension benefits. 24 Congress was concerned that abuses in the

private pension system were denying pensions to many workers. 25 To prevent these abuses, ERISA "set standards for participation, vesting and
funding, established an insurance system to protect pension plans and
provided express statutory fiduciary responsibility and full disclosure requirements" for both pension and welfare plans. 26 ERISA broadly defines
23. Martin Wald & David E. Kenty, Prefaceof ERISA: A COMPREHENSiVE GuIDE,
supra note 8, at iii. In fact, one commentator remarked that "according to legend,
ERISA is an acronym for Every Ridiculous Idea Since Adam." Jayne Elizabeth Zanglein, Employee Benefits for GeneralPractitioners: Ten Rules Every Attorney Should Know
About ERISA, 26 TEX. TECH L. REv. 579, 580 (1995). Another commentator remarked that "[i]n most quarters, merely mentioning ERISA is like spraying the air
with a potent toxin that glazes the eyes and dulls the brain." Martin, supranote 10,
at 42-43. In particular, ERISA's preemption provisions have been likened to a "veritable Sargasso Sea of obfuscation." Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 14 F.3d 708, 717
(2d Cir. 1993), rev'd sub nom. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue
Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995).

24. See Thomas W. Jennings, Introduction to ERISA: A COMPREHENSIVE

GUIDE,

supra note 8, at 1 (discussing ERISA's protections against pension benefit abuse
and stating that ERISA's "mandate to encourage plan participation has been attained"); see also Gregory, supra note 10, at 432 n.6 (stating that primary policy
objective of ERISA is to encourage and enhance greater pension retirement security in private sector of United States, but without government compulsion of universal pension coverage).
25. See CoLEMAN, supra note 8, at xiii ("The major impetus for the enactment
of... ERISA was abuse and mismanagement in the private pension system."); see
also LarryJ. Pittman, ERISA 's Preemption Clause and the Health Care Industry: An Abdication ofJudicialLaw-CreatingAuthority, 46 FuA. L. REv. 355, 357-58 (1994) (stating
that Congress enacted ERISA to stop certain abuses that were occurring in employee pension plans, such as insufficient funding and employer schemes to avoid
paying pensions to employees who had given many years of service). In his concluding speech to Congress on ERISA in 1974, Senator Jacob Javits emphasized
that many pensioners were losing their pensions because of technical violations of
complicated vesting rules, retirement before age sixty-five and bankruptcy of companies with inadequately funded pension plans. See Michael S. Sirkin, The 20 Year
History of ERJSA, 68 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 321, 323 (1994) (explaining that ERISA was
intended to redress these problems by protecting workers, ensuring adequate retirement benefits upon retirement and assuring adequate funding).
26. Jennings, supra note 25, at 1; see also Bobinski, supra note 6, at 275 (stating
that Congress enacted ERISA "to set minimum standards of information disclosure
and to establish fiduciary responsibilities in .. .establishment, operation, and administration of employee benefit plans"); Karen A. Jordan, ERISA Pre-emption: Integrating Fabe into the Savings Clause Analysis, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 273, 279 (1995)
(noting that purpose of ERISA was to protect interests of participants in employee
benefit plans and their beneficiaries by requiring disclosure and reporting of other
financial information, by "'establishing standards of conduct, responsibility, and
obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, and by providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal courts."' (quoting 29
U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1994))); Robert S. McDonough, Note, ERISA Preemption of State
Mandated-ProviderLaws, 1985 DUKE L.J. 1194, 1198 (1985) (discussing ERISA's leg-
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"welfare plan" as "any plan, fund, or program... maintained for the pur.pose of providing for its participants or their beneficiaries, through the
27
purchase of insurance or otherwise . . . medical . . . benefits."
Prior to the enactment of ERISA, the regulation of employee benefit
plans varied widely from state to state. 28 Congress's main goals in enacting ERISA were to create a uniform national law governing employee benefit plans and to eliminate "'the threat of conflicting or inconsistent State
and local regulation.'"29 To achieve these goals, Congress included a

islative history and noting that its purpose was to impose reporting, disclosure,
participation, funding and vesting standards on pension plans and to place fiduciary duties on plan managers).
27. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1994).
28. See Robert M. Goldich & Jonathan D. Wetchler, Civil Enforcement, in ERISA: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE, supra note 8, at 244 (noting "tremendous" variation

among employee benefit plan regulation prior to ERISA). One of the first major
private pension plans in the United States was created by the American Express
Company in 1875. See Gregory, supranote 10, at 437. Later, some unions began to
provide pension plans for their members. See id. In the early twentieth century,
some state and local governments also began to provide pensions to their public
sector employees. See id. at 438.
Employers viewed early pension plans solely as gratuities, rather than as accrued vested rights or as forms of deferred compensation. See id. (noting that result was that law did not consider employees to have property claims to pensions
and, therefore, their legal status as beneficiaries was not secure). In addition, early
pension plans were usually unfunded and contained no real safeguards to insure
that employees would ever receive their pensions upon retirement. See id. (noting
risks that employees faced before ERISA set standards for pension plans). Gradually, various trusts were established to administer pension plans. See id. at 439 (stating that, nonetheless, individual state law primarily governed pension regulation).
29. Kurt R. Anderson, Current Issues in ERISA Preemption, in ERISA: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE, supra note 8, at 250 (quoting Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne,
482 U.S. 1, 9 (1987)); see also Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 52223 (1981) (stating that Congress intended to establish pension plan regulation as
exclusively federal concern); Gregory, supra note 10, at 454-58 (discussing Congress's intent that ERISA not be compromised by host of potentially contradictory
state laws); Pittman, supra note 25, at 375 (stating that Congress enacted preemption provisions to achieve its goal of avoiding regulation of ERISA plans by multiple and conflicting state laws); Rebecca S. Fellman-Caldwell, Note, New York State
Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co.: The
Supreme Court Clarifies ERISA Preemption, 45 CATH. U. L. REv. 1309, 1312 (1996)
(noting that purpose of preemption clause is to ensure national uniformity of pension benefit protections); McDonough, supra note 26, at 1200-01 (discussing that
ERISA's legislative history shows that Congress intended preemption clause to occupy entire field of employee benefit plan regulation).
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31
provision in the statute.

Unfortunately, Congress did not clearly delineate the scope of ERISA
preemption and, as a result, there have been thousands of judicial opinions attempting to settle the matter. 32 Any analysis of ERISA preemption
must begin with the interpretation of three clauses: the preemption
clause, the savings clause and the deemer clause.
30. See Goldich & Wetchler, supra note 28, at 244 (discussing preemption).
Preemption refers to the power granted by Article VI of the United States Constitution, the Supremacy Clause, to the federal government to supplant state law in
those areas in which the federal government has regulatory powers under the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 ("[T]he Laws of the United States ... shall be
the supreme Law of the Land .... "). The Supremacy Clause "may entail preemption of state law either by express provision, by implication, or by a conflict
between federal and state law." New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue
Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 654 (1995); see also Pacific Gas &
Elec. Co. v. Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 204
(1983) (stating that state law is preempted to extent it conflicts with federal lawfor example, "when 'compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility' . . . or where state law 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress"' (quoting
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963)) (citations omitted));Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) (stating that
Congress may preempt state law by including express language in federal law to
prohibit states from regulating area that federal law addresses); Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (discussing that Congress may preempt
state law by implication when "scheme of federal regulation [is] ... so pervasive as
to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to
supplement it" or "the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will
be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject").
31. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) ("[T]he provisions of this subchapter . . . shall
supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any
employee benefit plan described in section 1003 (a) of this title and not exempt
under section 1003 (b) of this tile."). This provision is "notable for its breadth."
United Wire, Metal & Mach. Health & Welfare Fund v. Morristown Mem'l Hosp.,
995 F.2d 1179, 1191 (3d Cir. 1993); see also FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52,58
(1990) (stating that preemption clause is "conspicuous for its breadth"); Pilot Life
Ins. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1987) (finding that Congress chose "deliberately expansive" language for preemption clause). Commentators have even remarked that the language of the preemption clause "sweeps as broadly as the
English language allows." Irish & Cohen, supra note 10, at 110; see also Gregory,
supra note 10, at 430-31 (stating that Congress included in ERISA one of most
sweeping preemption clauses ever included in any federal legislation). For a detailed treatment of the preemption provisions, see infra notes 33-57 and accompanying text.
32. See Perritt, supra note 12, at 346 ("A recent LEXIS search indicates that
there are now over 2800judicial opinions addressing ERISA pre-emption.") (citing
District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 135 n.3 (1992)
(Stevens, J., dissenting)). Since Justice Stevens's count in the Greater Washington
case, the body of ERISA case law has continued to grow. See Fisk, supra note 7, at
59 & n.106 (observing that recent search in Westlaw "Allfeds" data-base (ERISA /p
preempt!) produced 3330 cases). The complexity and ambiguity of the ERISA
preemption provisions fuels the litigation associated with ERISA preemption.
Even the Supreme Court has remarked that "the two pre-emption sections, while
clear enough on their faces, perhaps are not a model of legislative drafting." Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985).
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The Preemption, Savings and Deemer Clauses

The preemption clause identifies those state laws that ERISA will preempt. 33 It provides that the ERISA provisions "shall supersede any and all
State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee
benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this title and not exempt
34
under section 1003(b) of this title."
This expansive language in the preemption clause is reined in by the
savings clause. The savings clause exempts from preemption state laws
that would otherwise be included within the broad scope of the preemption clause. 35 The savings clause provides that "[e]xcept as provided in
subparagraph (B) [the deemer clause], nothing in this subchapter shall
be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State
which regulates insurance, banking, or securities." 36 Much of the confusion in preemption analysis stems from the relationship between the language of the preemption and savings clauses, because while the "general
preemption clause broadly pre-empts state law, the savings clause appears
broadly to preserve the States' lawmaking power over much of the same
regulation. While Congress occasionally decides to return to the States
what it has previously taken away, it does not normally do both at the same
37
time."
The savings clause was added to make ERISA consistent with the McCarran-Ferguson Act,38 and to reassert that state governments, not the federal government, would primarily be responsible for the regulation of
33. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (defining scope of preemption).
34. Id.
35. See generally Perritt, supra note 12, at 255 (analyzing case law holding that

ERISA also preempts various state common law claims).
36. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b) (2) (A). This Note will only focus on the savings
clause analysis as it applies to insurance laws.
37. MetropolitanLife, 471 U.S. at 739-40. The Court noted that many commentators have urged Congress to amend the preemption provisions to eliminate this
confusion. See id. at 740 n.16 (citing Theodore Paul Manno, ERISA Preemption and
the McCarran-FergusonAct: The Need for CongressionalAction, 52 TEMP. L.Q. 51, 77
(1979); F. Okin, Preemption of State Insurance Regulation by ERISA, 13 A.B.A. FORUM
652, 678 (1978)).

38. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1115 (1994). The McCarran Act was passed in 1945 to
clarify the federal and state governments' roles in the regulation of insurance. See
Brown, supra note 9, at 351 n.78 (noting purpose of McCarran Act). Now known
as the McCarran-Ferguson Act, it provides in pertinent part:
No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede
any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of
insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such
Act specifically relates to the business of insurance: Provided, that ...
[the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the Federal Trade Commission
Act] shall be applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that
such business is not regulated by State law.
15 U.S.C. § 1012(b). For treatment of the relationship between the McCarranFerguson Act and ERISA, see McDonough, supra note 26, at 1206-10.
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insurance and insurance companies. 3 9 Unfortunately, the application of
the savings clause is complicated by the deemer clause. 40 Congress included this clause to prevent states from regulating employee benefit
plans through state insurance law. 41 The difficulty with the deemer clause
is determining the meaning of the phrase "business of insurance" as it is
42
used in the McCarran-Ferguson Act.

In MetropolitanLife Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts,43 the Supreme Court
explained the framework used to mark the boundaries between those regulations that come within the preemption clause and those regulations
that the savings clause rescues, while recognizing the deemer clause's effect on this framework. 44 At issue in MetropolitanLife was a Massachusetts
statute requiring that certain minimum mental health care benefits be
provided to Massachusetts residents who were insured by a general health
insurance policy or under an employee health care plan that covers hospital and surgical expenses. 4 5 .Massachusetts argued that its mandated benefit law, as applied to insurance companies that sell insurance to benefit
plans, is a law that "regulates insurance" and, therefore, is saved from preemption.

46

The Court agreed.

47

39. See Brown, supra note 9, at 351 (noting savings clause reasserted that state
governments are responsible for regulating insurance); see also Goldich &

Wetchler, supra note 28, at 245 (noting that ERISA also contains deemer clause
which has purpose of preventing "states from regulating employee benefit plans
via state insurance law").
40. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2) (B) (providing for deemer clause).
41. See Goldich & Wetchler, supra note 28, at 245 (noting purpose of deemer
clause); see also Groves, supra note 12, at 623 (stating that obvious purpose of
deemer clause is to ensure that states cannot affect employee benefit plans under
guise of insurance regulation).
42. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b). The Supreme Court has not written many opinions

explaining the scope of ERISA's savings clause. SeeJordan, supra note 26, at 280
(stating that Supreme Court has not had many opportunities to precisely articulate
scope of ERISA's savings clause). The savings clause is problematic because it
seems to contradict the expansive preemption clause by preserving the states' lawmaking power over many laws that meet the "relate to" test and, therefore, would
otherwise be preempted. See id. (noting apparent conflict between savings and

preemption clauses).
43. 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
44. See id. at 740-43. This framework was originally set forth in Union Labor
Life Insurance Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 127-28 (1982).
45. Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 727.
46. See id. at 733. In 1979, the Massachusetts Attorney General brought suit in
Massachusetts superior court for declaratory and injunctive relief to enforce its
mandated benefit law. See id. at 734. Massachusetts asserted that insurers had issued policies to group policyholders located outside Massachusetts that provided
for hospital and surgical coverage for certain residents of Massachusetts. See id.

Massachusetts also asserted that those policies did not provide Massachusetts-resi-

dent beneficiaries the mental-health coverage required by the statute and that the
insurers intended to issue more of these policies because they believed that the
statute did not apply to policies issued outside of Massachusetts. See id.

47. See id. at 746 (finding no preemption when state law "regulates
insurance").
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The MetropolitanLife Court explained that determining whether a statute regulated the "business of insurance" within the meaning of the savings clause is a two-step process. 4 8 First, the Court examined whether the

statute at issue met the commonsense definition of an insurance regulation. 49 Then, the Court analyzed three factors relevant to determining
whether the statute came within the savings clause's phrase "business of
insurance": (1) whether the statute has the effect of transferring or spreading a policyholder's risk; (2) whether the practice is an integral part of the
policy relationship between the insurer and the insured; and (3) whether
the practice is limited to entities within the insurance industry. 50 The
Court found that all three factors of the "business of insurance" test were
met.5 1 The Court also noted that its decision "results in a distinction between insured and uninsured plans, leaving the former open to indirect
regulation while the latter are not. By so doing, [it] .. .merely give [s] life

to a distinction created by Congress in the 'deemer clause."' 52 The addition of the deemer clause further complicates the above analysis. The
deemer clause limits the exemptions to ERISA preemption set forth in the
savings clause by providing that no employee benefit plan shall be deemed
to be an insurance company for53the purpose of any state law purporting to
regulate insurance companies.
48. Id. at 740-43. The Court stated that after a court determines if a statute
meets a commonsense definition of insurance regulation, it then considers
whether statute falls within savings clause. See id. at 741.
49. See id. at 740 (noting that commonsense analysis is reinforced by deemer
clause). The statute at issue required that general health insurance policies and
employee health care plans that cover hospital and surgical expenses also provide
certain minimum mental health care benefits to their Massachusetts plan participants. See id. at 730 (stating specifically that Massachusetts statute "requires that a
health-insurance policy provide 60 days of coverage for confinement in a mental
hospital equal to that provided by the policy for nonmental illness, and certain
outpatient benefits"). The Court found that this statute met the commonsense
definition of the business of insurance because it regulates the terms of certain
insurance contracts. See id. at 740 ("To state the obvious, the Massachusetts statute
regulates the terms of certain insurance contracts, and so seems to be saved from
pre-emption by the savings clause as a law 'which regulates insurance.'").
50. See id. at 743 (citing Union Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 129

(1982) and establishing three factor test).

51. See id. (applying principles set forth in Union Life). First, the Court stated

that the statute "obviously" met the spreading of risk factor because it was "intended to effectuate the legislative judgment that the risk of mental-health care
should be shared." Id. Second, the Court also found that the statute directly regulated an "integral part of the relationship between the insurer and the policyholder by limiting the type of insurance that an insurer may sell to the
policyholder." Id. Finally, the statute met the third factor because the Court
found that mandated benefit statutes "impose[d] requirements only on insurers,
-with the intent of affecting the relationship between the insurer and the policyholder." Id.
52. Id. at 747.
53. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b) (2) (B) (1994) (setting forth deemer clause). The
statute provides that
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Basically, the deemer clause prevents a state from deeming an employee benefit plan an insurance company in an attempt to avoid preemption if the benefit plan would not otherwise be considered an insurance
company.5 4 The language of the deemer clause is so broad that it could
be interpreted to nullify the savings clause. 55 Canons of statutory construction, however, require that statutes be construed to give effect to
every provision. 56 The courts have adhered to this principle and have interpreted the deemer clause in a way that "save [s] some scope of opera57
tion for the savings clause."
B.

TraditionalApproach to EPJSA Preemption

Since ERISA was enacted, the Supreme Court has written opinions in
twelve ERISA preemption cases. 58 Traditionally, the Supreme Court has
[n]either an employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this
title, which is not exempt under section 1003(b) of this title
(other than a
plan established primarily for the purpose of providing death benefits),
nor any trust established under such a plan, shall be deemed to be an
insurance company or other insurer, bank, trust company, or investment
company or to be engaged in the business of insurance or banking for
the purposes of any law of any State purporting to regulate insurance
companies, insurance contracts, banks, trust companies, or investment
companies.
Id.
54. See MetropolitanLife, 471 U.S. at 740 (stating that this "common sense view"
is reinforced by language of statute).
55. See PERRr, supra note 12, at 362 (discussing boundary between deemer
clause and savings clause).
56. See id. (noting that "such an interpretation of the deemer clause would
eliminate any scope for the savings clause and thus make its inclusion in the statute
purposeless").
57. Id.
58. See New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 668 (1995) (finding that state statute did not "relate
to" employee benefit plans under ERISA and was not preempted); John Hancock
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 510 U.S. 86, 106 (1993) (holding
that "free funds" were under discretionary management of insurer and subject to
ERISA fiduciary obligations); District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade,
506 U.S. 125, 126-27 (1992) (stating that ERISA preempted District of Columbia
statute requiring health insurance coverage for injured employees); IngersollRand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 145 (1990) ("[lIt is no answer to a preemption argument that a particular plaintiff is not seeking recovery of pension
benefits."); FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 65 (1990) (finding ERISA
preempts application of state motor vehicle financial responsibility law to company's salaried health care plan); Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 117-21
(1989) (finding that employer's paying discharged employees unused vacation
time out of its general assets was not preempted by ERISA as "employee welfare
benefit plan"); Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 841
(1988) (holding that ERISA preempts Georgia antigarnishment provision); Fort
Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 23 (1987) (finding that one-time severance payment to employees upon plant closing was not preempted by ERISA);
Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 57 (1987) (finding that state lawsuit
regarding processing of ERISA claims was preempted by federal law); Metropolitan
Life, 471 U.S. at 758 (holding that ERISA does not preempt state law mandating
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broadly construed the preemption provisions. 59 For example, in Shaw v.
Delta Air Lines, Inc.,6 0 the Court stated that "[t] he breadth of... [ERISA's]
pre-emptive reach is apparent from [its] language." 6 1 This language was
"deliberately expansive." 62 A law "'relates to' an employee benefit plan, in
the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with or reference to
such a plan." 63 The Court has also noted that, provided a connection to
minimum health benefits); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 108 (1983)
(holding that although state disability benefit law "relates to" employee benefit
plan, ERISA does not preempt it because it was not maintained "solely for the purpose of complying with applicable ...disability insurance laws"); Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 526 (1981) (stating use of workers'
compensation to offset pension benefits did not violate ERISA). Two other cases
address ERISA preemption in the context of removal jurisdiction. See Metropolitan
Life, 481 U.S. at 59-60 (stating that Congress intended ERISA to preempt employees' common law and tort claims); Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers
Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 28 (1983) (holding suit by state in attempt to collect
taxes from welfare benefit trust was not removable to federal court on ERISA preemption question); see also Fisk, supra note 7, at 58 n.104. These cases were originally filed in state court and then removed to federal court on the grounds of
complete preemption. See id. (noting removal issues involved in cases).
59. See, e.g., Greater Washington, 506 U.S. at 129 (giving "relate to" clause of
section 514(a) its broad, ordinary meaning as used in Sixth Edition of Black's Law
Dictionary); FMC Corp., 498 U.S. at 58 (noting that preemption clause is "conspicuous for its breadth"); Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 46 (finding that Congress chose "deliberately expansive" language for preemption clause); Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96-97
(finding law "relates to" covered employee benefit plan if it has connection with or
reference to such plan).
60. 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
61. Id. at 96. The Shaw Court noted that the Court had recently considered
ERISA's preemption clause in Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504
(1981). Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96 n.15. In Alessi, a New Jersey statute prohibited a
method of calculating pension benefits which the Court found Congress intended
to permit when it enacted ERISA. See Alessi, 451 U.S. at 524 (holding that ERISA
preempted New Jersey statute because Congress intended to establish pension
plan regulation as exclusively federal concern and New Jersey statute eliminated
method of calculating pension benefits that federal law permits). In reaching its
holding, the Alessi Court relied primarily on the state law's frustration of congressional intent rather than the preemption clause's language. Id. The Shaw Court
explained that in Alessi the focus shifted from the preemption language to congressional intent because of the tension between state and federal law in that particular
case, a tension that does not exist in all preemption cases. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96
n.15.
62. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 46.
63. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96-97. A law will also relate to an ERISA plan if it singles
out such a plan for special treatment. See Mackey, 486 U.S. at 838 n.12 (holding
that portion of Georgia's garnishment statute "which singles out ERISA plans, by
express reference, for special treatment is pre-empted"); see also McCoy v. Massachusetts Inst. of Tech., 950 F.2d 13, 19-20 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding ERISA preempts
Massachusetts lien statute that "expressly singles out ERISA plans for special treatment"). Another way a statute can relate to an ERISA plan is if the rights or restrictions it creates are predicated upon the existence of such a plan. See McClendon,
498 U.S. at 142-45 (holding ERISA preempts employee's state law wrongful discharge claim when claim was based on allegation that discharge was motivated by
employer's desire to avoid making contributions to employee's pension fund);
United Wire Metal & Mach. Health & Welfare Fund v. NewJersey, 995 F.2d 1179,
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such a plan exists, ERISA will preempt a state law even if the law "is not
specifically designed to affect such [employee benefit] plans, or the effect
64
is only indirect."
The preemption doctrine, however, does have its limitations. In
Shaw, the Court stated that there may be cases in which "state actions may
affect employee benefit plans in too tenuous, remote, or peripheral a
manner to warrant a finding that the law 'relates to' the plan." 65 Despite
the Court's recognition of the limits of ERISA preemption, the Court's
expansive interpretation of the "relate to" clause does not allow many state
66
laws to have such a tenuous connection and escape preemption.

1192 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing Greater Washington, 506 U.S. at 126-27 (holding ERISA
preempts District of Columbia statute requiring employers who provide health insurance for their employees to provide equivalent health insurance coverage for
injured employees eligible for workers' compensation benefits)).
64. McClendon, 498 U.S. at 139 (quoting Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 47).
65. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 100 n.21. In Shaw, the Supreme Court had to determine
whether ERISA preempted two New York statutes. Id. at 88. The first was the New
York Human Rights Law, N.Y. EXEc. LAw §§ 290-301 (McKinney 1983), a comprehensive antidiscrimination statute that prohibited, among other practices, discrimination in employee benefit plans on the basis of pregnancy. See Shaw, 463 U.S. at
88. The other statute, the Disability Benefits Law, required employers to pay certain benefits to employees unable to work because of nonoccupational injuries or
illnesses, including pregnancy. See N.Y. WoRK COMP. LAw §§ 200-242 (McKinney
1983); Shaw, 463 U.S. at 89.
In a unanimous opinion, the Shaw Court held that ERISA preempted the
Human Rights Law. Id. at 100. The Court stated that "[t]he breadth of [ERISA's]
pre-emptive reach is apparent from [its] language." Id. at 96. After giving effect to
the statute's plain language, the Shaw Court had no difficulty in finding that ERISA preempted the New York statute. Id. at 100. Although the Court indicated
that a statute's plain language will not always "settle an issue," it was compelled to
give effect to the plain language in this case because it had no "good reason to
believe Congress intended the language to have some more restrictive meaning."
Id. at 97. Using a phrase which has become the touchstone for interpreting the
"relate to" language, the Court stated that "[a] law 'relates to' an employee benefit
plan, in the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with or reference to
such a plan." Id. at 96-97.
66. See Weisenborn, supra note 10, at 148 ("Rather than preempting laws that
have only a remote impact on ERISA plans or preempting only state regulation
that might impinge on the core protective aims of ERISA, the Court has interpreted the clauses more broadly.") (citing McClendon, 498 U.S. at 139).
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Courts have construed these provisions to preempt state laws dealing
with mandated benefits, 67 plans to cover the uninsured 68 and general
state contract and tort claims. 69 By preempting state regulations, ERISA
has created an "enormous, unanticipated 'regulatory vacuum."' 70 One
67. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 746-47
(1985) (holding that ERISA preempts Massachusetts statute requiring minimum
mental health care benefits be provided to plan participants as it applies to selfinsured funds); Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Ahue, 807 F. Supp. 1501, 1504-05 (D. Haw.
1992) (holding that ERISA preempted Hawaii statute that required employers to
pay for physical examinations of flight captains required by Federal Aviation Association). In MetropolitanLife, the Court held that ERISA did not preempt a Massachusetts statute requiring that certain minimum mental health care benefits be
provided to Massachusetts residents who are insured under general health insurance policies or employee health care plans that cover hospital and surgical expenses. Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 758. The Court's holding, however, indicated
that the statute as it applied to self-insured funds was preempted by ERISA. See id. at
747 (noting that uninsured or self-insured plans are not open to indirect
regulation).
68. See, e.g., Bricklayers Local No. 1 Welfare Fund v. Louisiana Health Ins.
Ass'n, 771 F. Supp. 771, 776 (E.D. La. 1991) (holding that ERISA preempts Louisiana statute establishing catastrophic health insurance fund financed by service
charges imposed on insurers and self-insurers to extent that it applies to self-insured plans).
69. See Weisenborn, supra note 10, at 151-53 (discussing application of ERISA
preemption). With respect to state tort and contract laws, "state courts have refused to hear cases addressing fraudulent misrepresentation, bad faith refusal to
pay [a] claim and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims on the ground
that ERISA preempted the state law claims." Id. at 152.
70. Fisk, supra note 7, at 37; see Parmet, supra note 7, at 135-36 (stating that
antiregulatory bias is inherent in ERISA's structure because ERISA preempts state
laws, but does not provide much substantive regulatory content in health area);
Pittman, supra note 25, at 360 (stating that ERISA's preemption clause is being
interpreted to "give paramount importance to a policy of creating a uniformity of
laws governing ERISA plans-to protect employers and benefit plans by preempting state law obligations-even when those obligations will cause no harm to ERISA's primary purpose of protecting employees and beneficiaries from
administrative and funding abuses"). Ironically, the expansive scope of ERISA preemption "has come at the expense of the very participants in employee benefit
plans whom ERISA was intended to protect." Jordan, supra note 10, at 258.
Some areas in which ERISA preemption has created a regulatory void include,
among others, workers' compensation programs, prevailing wage laws and statutes
allocating damages in tort and wrongful death actions. See District of Columbia v.
Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 126-27 (1992) (holding that ERISA preempted District of Columbia law regarding health benefits for injured employees
eligible for workers compensation); Mclnnis v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co.,
21 F.3d 586, 589-90 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding ERISA preempts North Carolina statute that limits medical expense reimbursement to insurer from estate of deceased); Travitz v. Northeast Dept. ILGWU Health & Welfare Fund, 13 F.3d 704,
710 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding ERISA preempts Pennsylvania statute precluding persons from recovering damages arising out of motor vehicle use from culpable
tortfeasor if claimant is otherwise eligible to receive those benefits from any program, group contract or other arrangement; Benson v. Wyatt Cafeterias, Inc., 780
F. Supp. 1132, 1134 (N.D. Tex. 1991) (holding ERISA preempts state workers'
compensation claims); Chamber of Commerce v. Bragdon, 769 F. Supp. 1537,
1547 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (holding ERISA preempts prevailing wage rate legislation),
affd, 64 F.3d 497 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Fisk, supra note 7, at 37 & nn.6-15.
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commentator noted that "ERISA's sweeping preemption of state laws ... is
odd, because ERISA itself has little to do with the regulation of health
finance; it simply imposes fiduciary and reporting obligations on private
71
employee benefit plans."
C.

Modern Approach to ERISA Preemption

Two recent cases have signaled a change in the courts interpretation
of ERISA preemption: United Wire, Metal & Machine Health & Welfare Fund
v. Morristown Memorial HospitaF2 and the Travelers decision. 73 These cases
demonstrate that the courts appear to be retreating from the broad ap74
proach to ERISA preemption exemplified in Shaw.
In United Wire, the Third Circuit had to determine whether ERISA
preempted a NewJersey hospital rate-setting statute that allowed hospitals
to charge insurers and self-funded employee benefit plans for losses incurred from providing care to indigent and Medicare patients. 75 The
71. Fisk, supra note 7, at 36. This commentator goes on to compare ERISA's
"sparse regulation of health and other benefit plans" with its comprehensive regulation of pension plans. Id. at 36 n.5. Professor Fisk concludes that the broad
preemption of state laws related to pension plans has not created the same regulatory vacuum that ERISA has caused in the area of nonpension (welfare benefit)
plans. See id.
72. 995 F.2d 1179 (3d Cir. 1993).
73. See New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 658 (1995) (holding that ERISA does not preempt
New York statute that requires hospitals to collect surcharges from patients insured
by commercial insurers except those of Blue Cross and Blue Shield).
74. See Travelers, 514 U.S. at 662 (explaining that cost uniformity was not object of preemption and "far cry" from attempt by Congress to insulate ERISA
plans); United Wire, 995 F.2d at 1195 (narrowing focus of "relate to" clause by rejecting argument that ERISA preempted statute merely because it mentioned types
of ERISA plans in its definitional section). For a discussion of the Travelers decision, see infra notes 81-94 and accompanying text.
75. United Wire, 995 F.2d at 1189. Several self-insured employee benefit plans
and several individual participants in the plans filed suit to prevent New Jersey's
statutory hospital rate setting scheme from applying to them. See id. at 1188. They
also requested restitution of money paid under protest under that statutory
scheme. See id. They argued both that ERISA preempted the New Jersey statute
and that the application of the statute was an unconstitutional taking of property
without just compensation. See id.
After quickly finding that the statute did not constitute an unlawful taking of
property without just compensation, the Third Circuit addressed a "somewhat
thornier question": whether ERISA preempted the rate setting scheme. Id. at
1190-91. Because the plans were covered by ERISA, the issue before the court was
whether the statute "related to" the plans in a way that mandated preemption. See
id. at 1191.
The Third Circuit held that the statute did not "relate to" the plans in such a
way as to trigger preemption. See id. Significant to the court' decision was the fact
that the statute did not single out ERISA plans for special treatment. See id. at 1192
(stating that because statute was one of general applicability that did not single out
ERISA plans for special treatment and because statute functions without reference
to ERISA plans, "the cases which have cordoned off this area of preemption are
inapplicable"). The United Wire court also refused to find preemption on the
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court held that ERISA did not preempt the hospital rate-setting plan because the New Jersey statute was a generally applicable law that (1) was
not intended to regulate the affairs of ERISA plans; (2) neither singled out
such plans for special treatment nor predicated rights or obligations on
the existence of an ERISA plan; and (3) did not have either the effect of
dictating or restricting the manner in which ERISA plans structure or conduct their affairs or the effect of impairing their ability to operate simulta76
neously in more than one state.
The Third Circuit's opinion is noteworthy for its willingness to narrow
the focus of the "relate to" clause. The court rejected the plans' argument
that ERISA preempted the statute merely because it expressly referred to a
type of ERISA plan when defining some of the statute's terms. 77 The
court stated that "where, as here, a reference to an ERISA plan can be
excised without altering the legal effect of a statute in any way, we believe
the reference should be regarded as without legal consequence for ...
[purposes of the 'relate to' clause.]" 7 8 The court's narrow approach to
the "relate to" clause was also evident in its refusal to find preemption
simply because the statute may have the indirect ultimate effect of increasing plan costs. 7 9 This view was affirmed by the Supreme Court in
80

Travelers.
In Travelers, the Court spared from preemption a New York statute
requiring hospitals to impose surcharges on patients insured by commergrounds that when, like New Jersey's rate setting scheme, a generally applicable
statute does not affect the structure, administration or type of benefits provided by
an ERISA plan, the mere fact that the statute has some economic effect on the
plan does not mandate preemption. See id. at 1194 (stating that mere economic
impact on ERISA plan will not invalidate generally applicable statute that does not
affect structure, administration or type of benefits of ERISA plan).
76. See United Wire, 995 F.2d at 1195.
77. See id. at 1192 n.6. The plans argued that because the statute referred to
"self-funded union" plans as one example of a "third party payor," ERISA preempted it. See id. As an example, the court also stated that a hypothetical state
statute providing that "'no employer, including an ERISA plan, shall discriminate
on grounds of race or gender'" would not be preempted despite its reference to
an ERISA plan. Id.
78. Id.
79. See id. at 1193 (observing that when there is no direct nexus between state
statute and ERISA plans, and no effect on such plans' manner of conducting business or their ability to operate in interstate commerce, courts have upheld such
statutes despite fact that they may indirectly increase plan costs). To hold otherwise, and find that ERISA invalidated every state law that may increase the cost of
operating employee benefit plans, would give those plans "a charmed existence
that never was contemplated by Congress." Id. at 1194.
80. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 661 (1995). The Travelers Court stated that to interpret
preemption provision as "displacing all state laws affecting costs and charges on
the theory that they indirectly relate to ERISA plans that purchase insurance policies ... would effectively read the limiting language in ... [the "relate to" clause]
out of the statute, a conclusion that would violate basic principles of statutory interpretation." Id.
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cial insurers, but not on patients covered by Blue Cross/Blue Shield
plans.8 1 In doing so, the Court held that ERISA does not preempt state
laws that have only an indirect economic effect on employee benefit plans,
82
and do not function as a regulation of an ERISA plan.
The Travelers Court began its analysis by noting that "despite the variety of... opportunities for federal preeminence, we have never assumed
lightly that Congress has derogated state regulation, but instead have addressed claims of pre-emption with the starting presumption that Congress does not intend to supplant state law."8 3 Thus, at the outset, the
Court presumes a state statute to be valid.84 This presumption is especially
true in cases in which "federal law is said to bar state action in fields of
traditional state regulation."85 In these cases, like the Travelers case, the
Court will assume that the "'historic police powers of the States were not
to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest
86
purpose of Congress."'
Despite this presumption against preemption, the Travelers Court
noted that the preemption language is "clearly expansive," because this
language "marks for preemption 'all laws insofar as they ... relate to any
employee benefit plan' covered by ERISA."87 The Court even "wonder[ed], at first blush, whether the words of limitation ('insofar as they...
relate') do much limiting."8 8 The Court concluded that the words must
actually do some limiting because "[i]f 'relate to' were taken to extend to
the furthest stretch of its indeterminancy, then for all practical purposes
pre-emption would never run its course." 89 This interpretation, however,
would "be to read Congress's words of limitation as mere sham, and to
read the presumption against pre-emption out of the law whenever Congress speaks to the matter with generality."90
81. Id. at 645. Although the Court granted certiorari to resolve the circuit
split on the validity of state "hospital rate setting" laws, the Court's fundamental
reason for hearing the case was to provide more definitive guidance to courts that
must determine which state laws Congress intended ERISA to preempt. SeeJordan,
supra note 10, at 286 (asserting that Court's decision reflects "new, tighter standard" for determining preemption in cases in which state law affects benefit structure or administrative practices of ERISA plan).
82. See Travelers, 514 U.S. at 662 ("[L]aws with only an indirect economic effect on the relative costs of various health insurance packages in a given State are a
far cry from those 'conflicting directives' from which Congress meant to insulate
ERISA plans.").
83. Id. at 654.
84. See id. at 655.
85. Id. at 655 (citing Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Lab., Inc., 471
U.S. 707, 719 (1985)).
86. Id. (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
87. Id.
88. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994)).
89. Id.
90. Id. Additionally, the Court admitted that "our prior attempt to construe
the phrase 'relate to' does not give us much help drawing the line here." Id.
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Because the Court did not find the text of the preemption clause
helpful, it looked to the objectives of the ERISA statute as a guide for
determining the scope of state laws that Congress intended to survive preemption. 9 1 The objective of the preemption clause was "to avoid a multiplicity of regulation in order to permit the nationally uniform
administration of employee benefit plans."92 Even given this objective,
the Court noted that "nothing in the language of. . . [ERISA] or the
context of its passage indicates that Congress chose to displace general
health care regulation, which historically has been a matter of local concern." 93 In sum, the Court found that the New York surcharges did not
"relate to" ERISA plans within the meaning of the preemption clause. 9 4
The holding was based on the conclusions that the surcharges had only an
indirect economic effect on ERISA plans, and furthermore, do not force
95
ERISA plans to adopt a particular scheme of substantive coverage.
This holding, although not a complete departure from past precedent, represented a shift from the Court's traditionally broad interpretation of ERISA preemption. 9 6 In the recent Fifth Circuit case, CIGNA
Healthplan,Louisiana urged the court to apply the Travelers Court's analy91. See id. at 656 ("We simply must go beyond the unhelpful text and the
frustrating difficulty of defining its key term and look instead to the objectives of
the ERISA statute as a guide to the scope of the state law that Congress understood
would survive.").
92. Id. at 657.
93. Id. at 661 (citing Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Lab., Inc., 471
U.S. 707, 719 (1985)).
94. See id. at 668 (acknowledging that ERISA would preempt state laws that
cause acute, even if indirect, economic effects such that ERISA plans might be

forced to adopt particular scheme of coverage or restrict its choice of insurers but
New York statute at issue did not do either).
95. See id. ("[T]hey affect only indirectly the relative prices of insurance policies, a result no different from myriad state laws in areas traditionally subject to
local regulation, which Congress could not possibly have intended to eliminate.").
96. See Fisk, supra note 7, at 39-40 (expressing relief that Supreme Court
changed its approach in interpreting ERISA's preemption provisions). Professor
Fisk stated that
[f]ortunately, the Supreme Court ...decided a case that suggests that the
Justices have'realized they erred and are taking a different approach, if
not to statutory interpretation in general, at least to ERISA preemption of
state law .... [T]he Court abandoned its slavish devotion to literalist

textualism in interpreting ERISA's broad preemption provision and instead adopted a pragmatic approach. The Court will no longer look to
the dictionary definition of the words of... [the preemption clause], but
instead will ask whether preemption of state law will serve the objectives
of ERISA. This signals a long overdue and laudable reorientation in the
Court's approach to ERISA preemption.
Id. Other commentators agree that Travelers represented an important milestone
in preemption analysis:
The Court's opinion in Travelers can be construed as sending a signal for
judicial restraint when determining whether state laws are pre-empted by
ERISA. The Court's approach in resolving the issue.., and its emphasis

on fundamental premises such as presumption against pre-emption of
health care regulations can be construed as suggesting that courts should
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sis to spare a Louisiana statute from ERISA preemption. 9 7 The Fifth Circuit, however, distinguished Travelers from the case at bar and
98
consequently found preemption.

III.

CJGNA

HEALTHPLAN OF LOUISIANA, INC. v LOUISIANA

A.

Facts and ProceduralHistory

In CIGNA Healthplan, the Fifth Circuit held that Louisiana's "any willing provider" statute 99 ("the Any Willing Provider Statute") relates to employee benefit plans within the meaning of ERISA's preemption clause,
and that the statute is not exempt from preemption by ERISA's insurance
savings clause. 100 In doing so, the court created an apparent circuit split
engage in a more pragmatic and disciplined analysis of ERISA pre-emption issues.
Jordan, supra note 10, at 261; see also Goldich & Wetchler, supra note 28, in ERISA:
A COMPREHENSrVE GUIDE 98 (Martin Wald & David E. Kenty eds., Supp. 1996) (noting that, in Travelers, Supreme Court implicitly endorses Third Circuit's approach
in United Wire and signifies retreat from broad view of ERISA preemption); L.
Frank Coan, Jr., Note, You Can't Get Therefrom Here-Questioningthe Erosion of ERISA Preemption in Medical MalpracticeActions against HMOs, 30 GA. L. REv. 1023,
1025 (1996) (stating that Travelers represents retreat from Supreme Court's traditionally broad reading of ERISA's preemption clause); Fellman-Caldwell, supra
note 29, at 1343 (noting that Travelers marks turning point in evolution of ERISA
preemption because it changes broad interpretation of preemption clause); David
T. Shapiro, Note, The Remission of ERISA Preemption:An Examination of Blue Cross/
Blue Shield v. Travelers Insurance Co., 28 CONN. L. REv. 917, 946 (1996) (stating
that Travelersdecision put ERISA preemption back in harmony with current needs
of nation because it refocused scope of preemption clause to protect ERISA plans
from state laws that directly target plan administration and are inconsistent with
national legislation). But see Seymour LaRock, Have Tax-Exempt Managed Care Enti-

ties Been Given Competitive Advantage by High Court?, 50 EMPLOYEE

BENEFT PLAN REV.

10 (Oct. 1995) ("Reports of the demise of ERISA preemption are greatly exaggerated. While a number of recent decisions, including Travelers, address the limits of
its reach, ERISA preemption continues to provide vital and vibrant protection to
employee benefit plans and their sponsors and administrators.").
97. See Brief for Appellant at 13, CIGNA Healthplan of La., Inc. v. Louisiana,
82 F.3d 642 (5th Cir. 1996) (No. 95-30481) (stating that Louisiana statute "provides for only a possible indirect economic effect, if any, on all insurance products"
and, therefore, should not be preempted by ERISA under Travelers analysis).
98. See CIGNA Healthplan of La., Inc. v. Louisiana, 82 F.3d 642, 650 (1996)
(noting that unlike statute at issue in Travelers, this statute mandates that certain
benefits available to ERISA plans must be constructed in particular manner and
recognizing that ERISA preempts "state laws that mandate employee benefit
structures").
99. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:2202(5)(c) (West 1992).
100. CIGNA Healthplan, 82 F.3d at 650. The Health Law Litigation Reporter observed that the effect of the court's decision was that employer sponsored preferred provider organizations may include and exclude whatever health care
providers they wish, notwithstanding the contrary language of the Louisiana statute. 5th Cir.: Any Willing Provider Statute Preempted by ERISA, HEALTH L. LITIG. REP.
(Andrews Publications, Inc.), June 1996, at 16.
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regarding the application of ERISA's preemption doctrine to "any willing
provider" statutes.'
In 1984, the Louisiana legislature enacted the Health Care Cost Control Act ("the Act") 102 to reduce health care costs withoutjeopardizing the
quality of care received by patients.10 3 The Act specifically provides for
the formation of PPOs, which the statute defines as "contractual... agreements between a provider or providers and a group purchaser or purchasers to provide for alternate rates of payment."' 0 4 The Act defines "group
purchaser" as "an organization or entity which contracts with providers for
the purpose of establishing a preferred provider organization. " 10 5 To illustrate types of entities that fit within the "group purchaser" definition,
the Act states that "group purchaser" may include:
(a) Entities which contract for the benefit of their insured, employees, or members such as insurers, self-funded organizations,
Taft-Hartley trusts, or employers who establish or participate in
self-funded trusts or programs.
(b) Entities which serve as brokers for the formation of such contracts, including health care financiers, third party administra06
tors, providers, or other intermediaries.'
Under the Any Willing Provider Statute, "no licensed provider ... who,
agrees to the terms and conditions of the preferred provider contract shall
101. See Stuart Circle Hosp. Corp. v. Aetna Health Management, 995 F.2d
500, 500 (4th Cir. 1993) (sparing similar Virginia "any willing provider" statute
from preemption). The Fourth Circuit held that, although the statute "related to"
ERISA plans, it escaped preemption because it came within the insurance savings
clause. See id. at 503. The Virginia statute at issue in Stuart Circle, however, was not
identical to the one in CIGNA Healthplan. See id. (noting that Virginia statute was
.part of a comprehensive code regulating accident and sickness insurance," and its
language was directed only at insurance companies). The statute provided that
[a]ny such insurer shall establish terms and conditions that shall be met
by a hospital, physician or [other provider] in order to qualify for payment as a preferred provider under the policies or contracts ....
No
hospital, physician or [other provider] willing to meet the terms and conditions offered to it or him shall be excluded.
VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3407(B) (Michie 1990). The Virginia statute did not cover
entities beyond the insurance industry. See Stuart Circle, 995 F.2d at 503. In comparison, the Fifth Circuit found that the Louisiana statute encompassed entities
other than insurers. See CIGNA Healthplan,82 F.3d at 650 ("On its face, Louisiana's
statute obviously is not 'limited to entities within the insurance industry.'").
102. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:2201-2253 (West 1992).
103. See CIGNA Healthplan, 82 F.3d at 645 (describing reasons for Act).
104. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:2202(5).
105. Id. § 40:2202(3).
106. Id. § 40:2202(3) (a), (b); see CIGNA Healthplan, 82 F.3d at 645 (explaining Act's definition of "group purchaser"). To provide "incentive for purchasers

and providers" of health care "to strive for more cost-efficient and effective methods of providing quality patient care and more efficient payment for services rendered," the Act authorizes the "formation of preferred provider organizations."
LA. REv. STAT. ANN.

§ 40:2202(5)(c).
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be denied the right to become a preferred provider."1 0 7 In February 1993,
the Louisiana Attorney General's office issued an advisory opinion indicating that the "arbitrary exclusion from a PPO of a licensed physician who is
'willing and able to accede to the terms and conditions of the preferred
provider contract' constitutes both a violation of the Any Willing Provider
statute and an unfair trade practice under Louisiana Law.""' 8
Both CIGNA HealthPlan ("CIGNA") and Connecticut General Life
Insurance Company ("CGLIC") are "group purchasers" within the terms
of the Act. CIGNA is a licensed health maintenance organization (HMO)
that provides prepaid coverage to enrolled subscribers. 10 9 To provide this
coverage, CIGNA contracts with selected physicians, hospitals and other
health care providers who agree to adhere to CIGNA's quality control requirements and to offer their services to CIGNA subscribers at discounted
11 0
rates.
CGLIC is a licensed health insurer that markets CIGNA's provider
network in Louisiana.11 1 CGLIC also contracts with CIGNA for the right
to use the provider network that CGLIC offers to, and administers for, its
clients.1 12 Both CIGNA and CGLIC have clients who include the sponsors
1 13
of ERISA-qualified employee welfare benefit plans.
In 1994, CIGNA notified one of the physicians in its provider network
that it was terminating his contract.' 14 The physician sued CIGNA, alleging that his termination was in violation of the Any Willing Provider Statute. 1 15 After a temporary restraining order was issued against CIGNA, the
116
parties reached a settlement and the suit was dismissed.
This, however, was not the end of CIGNA's legal troubles. The Louisiana Attorney General's office notified CIGNA that a doctor had filed a
formal complaint alleging that CIGNA violated the Any Willing Provider
Statute by rejecting his application to its provider network. 117 In addition,
CIGNA had received applications to its provider network from several physicians that it wanted to reject. 118 Because of these events, plaintiffs feared
LA. Riv. STAT. ANN. § 40:2202(5) (c).
108. CIGNA Healthplan, 82 F.3d at 645 (quoting A Qualified Provider Cannot
Be Arbitrarily Excluded from a PPO Contract, La. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 92-824
(1993)).
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. See id. at 646.
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See id. Dr. Ronald Sylvest filed a private suit against CIGNA after he had
been given sixty days notice that he would be removed from CIGNA's provider
network. See id.
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. See id. CIGNA had already contracted with the "optimum" number of
health care providers of these physicians' specialties. See Brief for Appellee at 6,
CIGNA Healthplan (No. 95-30481) (stating that CIGNA wanted to contract selec-

107.
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suit by both private parties and the Attorney General for alleged violations
of the Any Willing Provider Statute.1 19 Because plaintiffs believed that this
statute was preempted by ERISA, they brought an action for declaratory
120
and injunctive relief.
CIGNA and CGLIC filed suit against the State of Louisiana seeking,
among other things, (1) a declaratory judgment holding that ERISA
preempts Louisiana's Any Willing Provider Statute 121 and (2) an injunction prohibiting the filing of any action against them for alleged violations
of the Any Willing Provider Statute. 122 The district court granted the
plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment by holding that ERISA preempts
the Any Willing Provider Statute to the extent that it relates to employee
welfare benefit plans governed by ERISA. 123 The district court also issued
tively with providers to ensure that "their provider network included an optimal
number of highly skilled providers in each specialty to meet the needs of the subscriber population efficiently and to maintain an effective program of quality control and utilization management").
119. See Brief for Appellee at 6, CIGNA Healthplan (No. 95-30481) (stating that
in addition to possibility of encouraging lawsuits, plaintiffs feared damage to their
reputation).
120. See id.
121. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:2202(5)(c) (West 1992) ("No licensed provider, other than a hospital, who agrees to the terms and conditions of the preferred provider contract shall be denied the right to become a preferred provider
to offer health services within the limits of his license.").
122. See CIGNA Healthplan, 82 F.3d at 644.
123. See CIGNA Healthplan of La., Inc. v. Louisiana, 883 F. Supp. 94, 102-104
(M.D. La. 1995) (addressing preemption issue after disposing of some preliminary
issues such as standing, subject matter jurisdiction and plaintiffs' due process
claims), affd, 82 F.3d 642 (5th Cir. 1996). The court observed that the preemption text is "notably loose." Id. Yet, the court also recognized that preemption is
not limitless. See id. at 103. The court, however, declined to find that the case
before it fell beyond the limits of ERISA preemption. See id. at 104. The court
agreed with CIGNA that the plain language of Louisiana's Any Willing Provider
Statute showed that it related to employee benefit plans within the meaning of
ERISA. See id. at 103. The court stated that "the language of the Act betrays the
State's perception that the statute is no more than a law of general applicability,
with no specific reference to ERISA-governed plans." Id. In particular, the court
observed that several provisions point to the Act's express reference and applicability to employee benefit plans. See id. For example, under the Act, "group purchasers" are defined to include benefit plans such as those operated by CIGNA. See id.
After finding that the Any Willing Provider Statute related to ERISA plans, the
court then considered whether the statute was nonetheless saved from preemption
as a law regulating insurance. See id. at 104. First, the court analyzed whether the
statute fit the commonsense definition of an insurance regulation. See id. Second,
the court applied the three Metropolitan Life factors: "(1) whether the statute has
the effect of spreading the policyholder's risk; (2) whether the practice is an integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer and the insured; and (3)
whether the practice is limited to entities within the insurance industry." Id. In
summary fashion, the court found that Louisiana's Any Willing Provider Statute
failed the common sense test because it was not specifically directed towards the
insurance industry, but rather, expressly applied to entities outside the insurance
industry, such as employers and Taft-Hartley trusts. See id. For this same reason,
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an injunction barring enforcement of the statute against CIGNA and
12 4
CGLIC.
B.

The Fifth Circuit's Analysis

The Fifth Circuit held that ERISA preempted Louisiana's Any Willing
Provider Statute. 125 The court began its analysis by setting forth the preemption language stating that ERISA "shall supersede any and all State
laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit
plan." 126 Even after acknowledging that "ERISA preemption is not without limits," the court nevertheless broadly construed the "relate to" language and found that this language encompassed Louisiana's Any Willing
Provider Statute. 12 7 The court found that the statute referred to ERISAqualified plans and that this was enough to satisfy the "relate to"
128
requirement.
Notably, the court reached this conclusion even though the Any Willing Provider Statute does not expressly refer to ERISA plans; it merely
requires that PPOs must accept any licensed provider who "agrees to the
terms and conditions of the preferred provider contract." 129 It is only by
piecing together the various definitions in the Act that the court determined that the Any Willing Provider Statute referred to ERISA-qualified
plans.' 30 Under the Act, a preferred provider contract is an agreement
"between a provider or providers and a group purchaser or purchasers to
provide for alternative rates of payment specified in advance for a defined
period of time." l31 According to the Act, group purchasers may include
such entities as "insurers, self-funded organizations, Taft-Hartley trusts or
employers who establish or participate in self-funded trusts or programs." 13 2 Because the court found that the entities which may constitute
the court found that the statute failed the third Metropolitan Life factor and, therefore, was preempted by ERISA. See id.
124. See id.
125. See CIGNA Healthplan, 82 F.3d at 650. The court first found that Louisiana's Any Willing Provider Statute related to employee benefit plans within the
meaning of ERISA. See id. at 647. The court then found that the statute was not
exempted from preemption by the savings clause. See id. at 650. The court began
and finished its analysis with the third factor of the Metropolitan Life test. See id.
The court found that "[o]n its face, Louisiana's statute obviously is not 'limited to
entities within the insurance industry,'" so ERISA's insurance exception did not
save the statute from preemption. Id.
126. Id. at 646.
127. Id. at 647.
128. See id.
129. LA. REv.

STAT. ANN.

§ 40:2202(5)(c) (West 1992).

130. See CIGNA Healthplan, 82 F.3d at 647-48, 648 n.36 (admitting that "in
holding that the statute refers to ERISA plans, we rely heavily on language that is
found not in the text of the statute itself, but rather in the surrounding provisions
of the Act that define the key terms of the statute").
131. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:2202(5) (a).
132. Id. § 40:2202(3) (a).
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group purchasers under the Act3 3may be ERISA-qualified plans, it held that
ERISA preempted the statute.'
As an alternative ground for finding that the statute "relate [s] to" ERISA plans, the court found that the Any Willing Provider Statute was "connected with such plans" because it prohibited "those ERISA plans which
elect to use PPOs from selecting a PPO that does not include any willing,
licensed provider." 13 4 Quoting Travelers, the court stated that preemption
was appropriate on this ground when statutes "'mandate employee benefit
structures or their administration.'"' 35 The court then found that the Any
Willing Provider Statute mandated employee benefit plan structures, and
13 6
therefore, this was sufficient to meet the "relate to" requirement.
In preemption analysis, a court's inquiry does not end when it has
determined that a statute falls within the preemption clause. The court
must still determine whether the savings clause rescues the statute from
preemption.' 3 7 After satisfying itself that the Louisiana statute was within
138
the preemption clause, the Fifth Circuit turned to the savings clause.
The court identified the framework for savings clause analysis set forth in
139
Metropolitan Life.
Under this framework, to qualify for the savings clause exception to
preemption, a statute must first meet the commonsense definition of an
insurance regulation. 140 Next, the statute must meet Metropolitan Life's
three factor test: (1) the statute must have the effect of spreading the policyholder's risk; (2) the statute must deal with an integral part of the policy
relationship between the insurer and the insured; and (3) the statute must
only apply to entities in the insurance industry. 14 1 The court noted that if
a statute fails to satisfy either the commonsense definition of insurance
regulation, or any one of the three Metropolitan Lfe factors, the savings
clause does not exempt it from preemption. 14 2 The court began and concluded its analysis with the consideration of the third factor of the Metro133. See CIGNA Healthplan,82 F.3d at 648 ("Given that these enumerated entities constitute ERISA-qualified plans, the Act, and through it the Any Willing Provider statute, expressly refers to ERISA plans.").
134. Id.
135. Id. (quoting New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 657 (1995)).

136. See id. (holding that statute connected with ERISA plans by prohibiting
selection of PPO not including any willing, licensed provider).
137. For a general discussion of the preemption framework and analysis, see
supra notes 33-98 and accompanying text.
138. See CIGNA Healthplan, 82 F.3d at 650 (setting forth ERISA's savings
clause).
139. See id. at 650. The court noted that the Fifth Circuit adopted the Metropolitan Life test for savings clause analysis in Tingle v. Pacific Mutual Insurance Co.,
996 F.2d 105 (5th Cir. 1993). See CIGNA Healthplan, 82 F.3d at 650.
140. See CIGNA Healthplan, 82 F.3d at 650.

141. See id. (noting that all three prongs must be satisfied for exemption and
that failure of any one prong would defeat exemption claim).
142. See id. (applying Metropolitan Life test for preemption).
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politan Life test: the Louisiana statute was not limited to entities within the
insurance industry 143 Even though the statute lists insurers as one group
covered by its terms, the court remarked that it also specifies, "in a nonexclusive list, that it applies. to 'self-funded organizations, Taft-Hartley
trusts or employers who establish or participate in self funded trusts or
programs.' 144 According to the court, this "non-exclusive list" was
enough to disqualify the statute from the savings clause and to hold that
145
ERISA preempted Louisiana's Any Willing Provider Statute.
IV.

How

THE FIFTH CIRCUIT FAILED TO CONTINUE THE WORK OF THE
TRAVELERs

COURT

The Fifth Circuit's decision in CIGNA Healthplan represents poor preemption analysis in light of the Supreme Court's narrow construction of
ERISA preemption in Travelers.x46 There, the Supreme Court took a narrow view of ERISA preemption, whereas the Fifth Circuit distinguished
this precedent and reverted back to the expansive view of preemption that
the Supreme Court announced in Metropolitan Life. 147 Although the Fifth
Circuit stated a legitimate basis upon which to distinguish Travelers-that
the New York statute in Travelers did not "bind plan administrators to any
particular choice,"1 48 whereas the Louisiana statute "specifically mandates
that certain benefits available to ERISA plans must be constructed in a
150
particular manner"' 4 9 -this distinction was more apparent than real.
143. See id. (concluding that statute failed third prong of Metropolitan Life test,
and therefore, court did not need to examine first two prongs or whether statute
satisfied commonsense definition of insurance regulation).
144. Id. (quoting LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:2202(3) (a) (West 1992)).
145. See id. ("[W] e may start and finish with the third factor of the Metropolitan Life test: On its face, Louisiana's statute obviously is not 'limited to entities
within the insurance industry.'").
146. See Leslie J. Gold, LouisianaPreemption Ruling May Limit Ability of States to
Regulate Networks, 23 Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) 1279 (May 13, 1996) (stating that
attorneys interviewed by Bureau of National Affairs after April 30, 1996 Fifth Circuit ruling agreed that court's decision appeared to be at odds with rulings on
scope of ERISA in recent cases such as Travelers).
The same article reported that in a May 6, 1996 statement, "CIGNA said that it
was pleased with the ruling because it affirmed the right of health maintenance
organizations, insurers and self-insured benefit plans to use selective provider
panels." Id. Richard Smith, the Vice President for health care policy at the Association for Private Pension and Welfare Plans in Washington, D.C., was also pleased
with the decision. See id. In his opinion, it "shows there's real teeth left in ERISA
preemption." Id.
147. For a discussion of the Travelers decision, see supra notes 80-96 and accompanying text.
148. New York State Conference of Blue Cross and Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 649 (1995).
149. CIGNA Healthplan, 82 F.3d at 649.
150. See LA. Ruv. STAT. ANN. § 40:2202(5)(c) (West 1992). Contrary to the

court's finding, Louisiana's statute does not mandate the benefit structure of ERISA plans. See id. Rather, the statute only requires that once the plans have set the
terms and conditions of their plans, they must accept any provider willing to meet
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The few cases that have addressed the validity of "any willing provider" laws have glossed over the threshold preemption issue. 151 Courts
have almost taken it for granted that the broad "relate to" language of the
ERISA preemption clause encompasses these statutes. The main inquiry
152
of these opinions, then, was the scope of the insurance savings clause.
Most of the courts that have considered "any willing provider" laws have
focused on whether the statute in question fits neatly into (or at least can
be manipulated into) the savings-clause.
Courts should not summarily find that all laws having any relation to
ERISA plans qualify for ERISA preemption. Rather, courts should perform a fresh' 53 analysis in light of Travelers to determine if these laws really
impose any substantive requirements on the benefit plans, or if "[s]uch
state laws leave plan administrators right where they would be in any case,
with the responsibility to choose the best overall coverage for the
money."1 54 This Note advocates that courts should perform a closer analysis of whether the "any willing provider" laws actually "relate to" an ERISA
plan. A closer analysis seems to suggest that these laws have a more "tenuous, remote or peripheral" connection and, therefore, should escape preemption. 155 For example, the Louisiana Any Willing Provider Statute that
was preempted in CIGNA Healthplan does not mandate or restrict an ERthose terms and conditions. See id. For a discussion of Louisiana's Any Willing
Provider Statute and its impact on employee benefit plans, see supra notes 99-108
and accompanying text.
151. See Stuart Circle Hosp. Corp. v. Aetna Health Mgmt., 995 F.2d 500, 503
(4th Cir. 1993) (finding that "any willing provider" statute relates to ERISA plans
because it applies to health benefit programs operated by insurers); Texas Pharmacy Ass'n v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 907 F. Supp. 1019, 1025 (W.D. Tex. 1995)
(finding, without further elaboration, that "any willing provider" statute relates to
ERISA plans because statute impacts ERISA plans), modified, 105 F.3d 1035 (5th
Cir. 1997). These cases, however, were decided before the Supreme Court's latest
pronouncement on ERISA preemption in Travelers, which indicated that courts
should scrutinize more closely the extent that a statute "relates to" an ERISA plan.
See Travelers, 514 U.S. at 662 (narrowing focus of "relate to" clause by stating that
cost uniformity was "far cry" from what Congress intended to be preempted by
ERISA).
152. See, e.g., Stuart Circle, 995 F.2d at 503 (affirming district court's finding
that Virginia "any willing provider" statute related to employee benefit plans within
meaning of ERISA and focusing majority of its opinion on analyzing scope of insurance savings clause).
153. See District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 135
(1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[I]t is time to take a fresh look at the intended
scope of the pre-emption provision that Congress enacted."). Justice Stevens criticized the majority for "converting unnecessarily broad dicta interpreting the words
'relate to' as used in [the ERISA preemption clause], into a rule of law." Id. at 133
(Stevens, J., dissenting). He added that "until today that broad reading of the
phrase has not been necessary to support any of this Court's actual holdings." Id.
at 135 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
154. Travelers, 514 U.S. at 662.
155. SeeShawv. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 100 n.21 (1983) (providing
that statutes with "tenuous, remote or peripheral" connection to ERISA plans will
not give rise to preemption).
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ISA plan's benefits, structure or administration. 156 Instead, this statute
merely protects the right of a health care provider to join a provider network if he or she is willing to meet its terms and conditions. 157 This connection to an ERISA plan is too tenuous to trigger preemption, especially
158
in light of the Travelers decision.
Despite this tenuous connection to an ERISA plan, the CIGNA Healthplan court held that the Louisiana Any Willing Provider Statute "relate [d]
to" employee benefit plans within the meaning of ERISA and, therefore,
was preempted. 159 The CIGNA Healthplancourt found that the statute related to ERISA plans for two reasons. First, the statute required ERISA
plans that elected to use PPOs to select a PPO that would accept any willing provider.' 60 Second, the Court reasoned that the statute applied to
ERISA plans because its definition section refers to entities that may in161
clude ERISA plans.

156. See LA. REv.

STAT. ANN. § 40:2202(5)(c) (West 1992).
157. See id. ("[N]o licensed provider.., who agrees to the terms and conditions of
the preferred provider contract shall be denied the right to become a preferred provider .... .") (emphasis added).
158. See Travelers, 514 U.S. at 672 (diminishing reach of "relate to" clause).
Any connection the Louisiana statute has to ERISA plans is too tenuous to trigger
preemption because its effect is not to "mandate employee benefit structures or
their administration" or "produce such acute, albeit indirect, economic effects, by
intent or otherwise, as to force an ERISA plan to adopt a certain scheme of coverage or effectively restrict its choice of insurers." Id. at 646. Rather, the Louisiana
statute may have an indirect economic effect on ERISA plans, but such "an indirect
economic influence ...does not bind plan administrators to any particular choice
and thus function as a regulation of an ERISA plan." Id. at 659.
159. See CIGNA Healthplan of La., Inc. v. Louisiana, 82 F.3d 642, 648 (5th
Cir. 1996).
160. See id. at 648. The court stated that
the statute "relates to" ERISA plans in the sense that it is connected with
such plans. The Supreme Court has emphasized that preemption is appropriate on this ground when statutes "mandate employee benefit structures or their administration." In the instant case, ERISA plans that
choose to offer coverage by PPOs are limited by the statute to using PPOs
of a certain structure-i.e., a structure that includes every willing, licensed provider. Stated another way, the statute prohibits those ERISA
plans which elect to use PPOs from selecting a PPO that does not include
any willing, licensed provider. As such, the statute connects with ERISA
plans.
Id. (quoting Travelers, 514 U.S. at 657).
161. Id. at 647. The court stated that the Any Willing Provider Statute referred to ERISA plans because it requires that PPOs accept all licensed providers
"who agree to the terms and conditions of the preferred provider contract." Id.
(citing LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:2202(5) (c)). Then the court noted that according
to the Act, a preferred provider contract constitutes an agreement "between a provider.., and a group purchaser.., to provide for alternative rates of payment
specified in advance for a defined period of time." Id. at 647-48. The court observed that under the Act "group purchasers" may include entities such as TaftHartley trusts or employers who establish or participate in self-funded programs
that contract with health care providers for the benefit of their employees. See id.
at 648. Because these entities constitute ERISA plans, the court held that the Act
referred to ERISA plans. See id. The court recognized, however, that "in holding
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ERISA should not preempt Louisiana's Any Willing Provider Statute
because it does not "relate to" employee benefit plans within the meaning
of ERISA. Despite the Fifth Circuit's ruling to the contrary, the Any Willing Provider Statute does not mandate the structure of ERISA plans, nor is
the statute's mere reference to ERISA plans sufficient to trigger
preemption.
A.

Louisiana's Any Willing ProviderStatute Does Not Mandate the Structure
of ERISA Plans

The general rule for ERISA preemption is that ERISA preempts state
laws that "relate to" an employee benefit plan.' 62 In Shaw, however, the
Supreme Court recognized that ERISA does not preempt a state law if it
affects employee benefit plans in "too tenuous, remote, or peripheral a
manner to warrant a finding that the law 'relates to' the plan." 163 The
difficulty of preemption analysis is determining the boundary between
laws that relate to employee benefit plans and laws that do not warrant
preemption because their effect on employee benefit plans is too tenuous,
64
remote or peripheral.'
To make this determination, "as in any pre-emption analysis, '[the]
purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone.'"165 Congress's purpose
in enacting the preemption clause was to "avoid a multiplicity of regulation in order to permit the nationally uniform administration of employee
benefit plans." 166 That is, ERISA preemption was designed to avoid conthat the statute refers to ERISA plans, we rely heavily on language that is found not
in the text of the statute itself, but rather in the surrounding provisions of the Act
that define the key terms of the statute." Id. at 648 & n.36.
162. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994) (preempting state laws if they "relate to
any employee benefit plan" as defined by ERISA).
163. Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 100 n.21. (1983).
164. For further discussion of the difficulty of determining what laws fall
within ERISA preemption's "relate to" clause, see supra notes 33-57 and accompanying text.
165. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 747 (1985)
(quoting Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978)); see also Travelers,
514 U.S. at 662 (using congressional intent as guide to interpreting ERISA preemption provisions); Shaw, 463 U.S. at 95 ("In deciding whether a federal law preempts a state statute, our task is to ascertain Congress' intent in enacting the federal statute at issue.").
166. Travelers, 514 U.S. at 657. See, e.g., FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 60
(1990) (holding that ERISA preempted Pennsylvania antisubrogation statute that

prevented Pennsylvania plans "from being structured in a manner requiring reimbursement in the event of recovery from a third party"); Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 526 (1981) (holding that ERISA preempted NewJersey
statute to extent that it prevents ERISA plans from decreasing benefits by amount

recipient is awarded in workers' compensation); Hampton Indus., Inc. v. Sparrow,
981 F.2d 726, 730 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding that ERISA preempted North Carolina
antisubrogation statute); National Elevator Indus., Inc. v. Calhoon, 957 F.2d 1555,
1561 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that ERISA preempted administrative determination of Oklahoma's prevailing wage statute to extent it determines rates of pay and
"may be used to effect change in the administration, structure and benefits of an
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flicting regulations that would make it difficult for plan sponsors to administer their benefit plans.1 67 These conflicting regulations may arise when
state laws mandate the structure and administration of employee benefit
plans.' 68 The Travelers Court explained that to remedy this problem, ERISA will preempt state law when the law "bind[s] plan administrators to
any particular choice and thus function[s] as a regulation of an ERISA
69
plan itself.'
ERISA plan"); Michigan Carpenters Council v. C.J. Rogers, Inc., 933 F.2d 376, 384
(6th Cir. 1991) (holding that ERISA preempted Michigan state corporate reorganization statute that allows employers unilaterally to alter their obligation to ERISA
plans).
167. See Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 9-11 (1987) (determining whether ERISA preempted Maine statute that required employers, in event of
plant closing, to provide one-time severance payment to employees not covered by
express contract providing for severance pay). Holding that ERISA did not preempt the Maine statute, the Fort Halifax Court explained the congressional intent
in enacting the preemption clause. Id. at 15. The Court stated that
[a]n employer that makes a commitment systematically to pay certain
benefits undertakes a host of obligations, such as determining the eligibility of claimants, calculating benefit levels, making disbursements, monitoring the availability of funds for benefit payment, and keeping
appropriate records in order to comply with applicable reporting requirements. The most efficient way to meet these responsibilities is to establish
a uniform administrative scheme, which provides a set of standard procedures to guide processing of claims and disbursement of benefits. Such a
system is difficult to achieve, however, if a benefit plan is subject to differing regulatory requirements in differing States....
... It is... clear that ERISA's preemption provision was prompted
by recognition that employers establishing and maintaining employee
benefit plans are faced with the task of coordinating complex administrative activities. A patchwork scheme of regulation would introduce considerable inefficiencies in benefit program operation, which might lead
those employers with existing plans to reduce benefits, and those without
such plans to refrain from adopting them. Preemption ensures that the
administrative practices of a benefit plan will be governed by only a single
set of regulations.
Id. at 9-11; see also United Wire, Metal & Mach. Health & Welfare Fund v. New
Jersey, 995 F.2d 1179, 1192 (3d Cir. 1993) (observing that ERISA preemption was
prompted by recognition that employers establishing employee benefit plans are
faced with task of coordinating complex administrative activities and that patchwork scheme of regulation would cause many inefficiencies in benefit program
operation, which might lead those employers with existing plans to reduce benefits
and those without existing plans to refrain from offering them).
168. See Fort Halifax, 482 U.S. at 11 ("It is for this reason that Congress pre-

empted state laws relating to plans rather than simply to benefits.").
169. Travelers, 514 U.S. at 659. In previous cases in which the Court has held
that ERISA preempted state law, the Court has found that the state law at issue
mandated the structure of employee benefit plans. In its analysis, the Court cited
Shaw, in which the Court held that the NewYork law at issue "prohibit[ed] employers from structuring their employee benefit plans in a manner that discriminate[d] on the basis of pregnancy." Travelers, 514 U.S. at 657 (citing Shaw, 463
U.S. 85, 96 (1983)). Another case in which the Court found ERISA preemption
based on the fact that the state law mandated employee benefit plan structure or
administration was FMC Corp. v. Holiday. See FMC Corp., 498 U.S. at 60 (holding
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In CIGNA Healthplan,the Fifth Circuit should not have held that ERISA preempted Louisiana's Any Willing Provider Statute because the statute does not bind plan administrators to a particular choice, nor does it
function as a regulation of ERISA plans. 170 The Fifth Circuit incorrectly
stated that Louisiana's Any Willing Provider Statute "specifically mandates
that certain benefits available to ERISA plans must be constructed in a
particular manner."171 Furthermore, the court made the inaccurate conclusion that the statute did not have a mere indirect economic effect on
the plans, but rather the statute delineated the very structure of the bene172
fit plans.
This conclusion is not accurate. As the Louisiana State Medical Society and the Louisiana Dental Association asserted in their amicus curiae
brief, the court failed to recognize that by requiring CIGNA to include in
its network any provider willing to meet the terms and conditions of the
network, the statute does not mandate that employee benefit plans adopt
any particular structure.1 73 Rather, the employee benefit plans retain control over the terms and conditions of their plans and the terms of their
provider contracts. In addition, the Any Willing Provider Statute does not
impair a plan sponsor's ability to offer the same benefits to employees in
that ERISA preempted Pennsylvania antisubrogation statute). The Travelers Court
noted that the Pennsylvania statute at issue in FMC Corp. "'prohibited] plans from
being structured in a manner requiring reimbursement in the event of recovery
from a third party' and 'require[d] plan providers to calculate benefit levels in
Pennsylvania based on expected liability conditions that differ from those in States
that have not enacted similar antisubrogation legislation,' thereby 'frustrat[ing]
plan administrators' continuing obligation to calculate uniform benefits levels nationwide.'" Travelers, 514 U.S. at 657-58 (quoting FMC Corp., 498 U.S. at 59).
170. See CIGNA Healthplan of La., Inc. v. Louisiana, 82 F.3d 642, 649 (5th
Cir. 1996) (stating that statute mandates construing ERISA benefits in specific way
as grounds for preemption). For a further discussion of the court's holding and
analysis in CIGNA Healthplan, see supra notes 98-145 and accompanying text.
171. CIGNA Healthplan,82 F.3d at 649.
172. See id.
173. Brief of Amicus Curiae of the Louisiana State Medical Society and the
Louisiana Dental Association in Support of Appellants at 8-9, CIGNA Healthplan
(No. 95-30481). According to the Louisiana State Medical Society and Louisiana
Dental Association,
[r]equiring [CIGNA and CGLIC] to include health care providers willing
and able to meet CIGNA's and CGLIC's contractual requirements does
not require employee benefit plans to structure their benefits or conduct
their internal affairs in any particular way. The any-willing-provider statute does not prohibit an employee benefit plan from offering coverage
through a preferred provider organization or specify the terms of the
provider contract. It does not impair a plan sponsor's ability to offer the
same benefits to employees in different states. It does not require any
ERISA plan... to pay any benefit, any level of benefit, or any particular
amount of a patient's medical bill. It does not impose any substantive
administrative requirements on ERISA plans.
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different states, nor does it require any ERISA plan to pay any particular
17 4
benefits or any particular amounts of patients' medical bills.
For these reasons the Any Willing Provider Statute does not mandate
any particular structure or administrative scheme for employee benefit
plans in Louisiana. Rather, the statute only becomes an issue for a PPO
after its plan administrators determine its benefit structure, terms and conditions. Cbnsequently, contrary to the Fifth Circuit's holding, plan administrators still control the substantive content of their PPO, and the statute
avoids ERISA-related concerns.
B.

Mere Reference to an ERISA Plan Should Not Trigger Preemption

The second basis upon which the Fifth Circuit held that the Louisiana
Any Willing Provider Statute related to ERISA was the court's improper
conclusion that the statute referred to ERISA plans. 1 75 As previously discussed, under Travelers, ERISA does not preempt state laws if they affect
ERISA plans in a tenuous, remote or peripheral manner1 76 For ERISA
preemption to operate, a state law must mandate or restrict the choices
offered under an ERISA plan. 17 7 Notwithstanding the Fifth Circuit's holding, a mere reference to an ERISA plan, without more, is insufficient to
178
trigger preemption.
In United Wire, the Third Circuit summarily dismissed an argument
similar to the explanation offered by the Fifth Circuit to justify its ruling
that the Louisiana statute related to ERISA plans. 179 In United Wire, the
appellee benefit plans argued that the NewJersey hospital rate-setting statute at issue "related to" ERISA plans because it expressly referred to "selffunded union plans" as one example of a "third party payor" as used in the
statute.1 80 The court responded that "[w]here, as here, a reference to an
ERISA plan can be excised without altering the legal effect of a statute in
174. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:2202(5) (c) (West 1992) ("[N]o licensed
provider... who agrees to the terms and conditions of the preferredprovider contract shall

be denied the right to become a preferred provider.") (emphasis added).
175. See CIGNA Healthplan, 82 F.3d at 647. For a further discussion of the
court's holding and analysis, see supra notes 98-145 and accompanying text.
176. See New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 672 (1995). For a further discussion of the Travelers
decision, see supra notes 80-96 and accompanying text.
177. See Travelers, 514 U.S. at 672 (discussing diminishing reach of "relate to"
clause).
178. See United Wire, Metal & Mach. Health & Welfare Fund v. Morristown
Mem'l Hosp., 995 F.2d 1179, 1192 n.6 (3d Cir. 1993) ("Where, as here, a reference
to an ERISA plan can be excised without altering the legal effect of a statute in any
way, we believe the reference should be regarded as without legal consequence for
[preemption] purposes.").
179. Id. For a further discussion of the United Wire decision, see supra notes
72-79 and accompanying text.
180. United Wire, 995 F.2d at 1192 & n.6.
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any way, we believe the reference should be regarded as without legal consequence for [preemption] purposes." 181
Like the New Jersey statute, Louisiana's Any Willing Provider Statute
indirectly refers to ERISA plans because it lists Taft-Hartley trusts and selffunded benefit plans as examples of entities that may constitute group
purchasers under the Act. 18 2 The Act is not limited to these entities, but
rather these entities are mentioned merely by way of example.' 8 3 Like the
self-funded union plans mentioned in the New Jersey statute, this reference to Taft-Hartley trusts and self-funded benefit plans can be excised
from the Louisiana statute without altering its legal effect.' 8 4 Accordingly,
under the United Wire rationale, this reference was an insufficient basis for
the Fifth Circuit to hold that the Louisiana statute related to ERISA and,
185
as a result, was preempted.
By ignoring the Third Circuit's sound reasoning, the Supreme
Court's modified approach to ERISA preemption in Travelersand the limiting language of Shaw, the Fifth Circuit revived a broader view of ERISA
preemption. This sweeping view of ERISA preemption will continue to
have adverse effects on state health care reform legislation and impede
86
any resolution to the nation's health care crisis.'

181. Id. This approach is consistent with the United Wire court's overall narrow approach to ERISA preemption. See id. at 1194 (holding ERISA does not preempt New Jersey hospital rate-setting program because it was not intended to
regulate affairs of ERISA plans, did not single out ERISA plans for special treatment and did not dictate or restrict manner in which ERISA plans structure or
conduct their affairs, nor did it affect their ability to operate simultaneously in
more than one state). Accordingly, the Third Circuit held that ERISA did not
preempt New Jersey's hospital rate-setting scheme. See id. at 1196.
182. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:2202(3) (a) (West 1992) (listing examples of
included entities). For a discussion of the Louisiana Any Willing Provider Statute
and its defined terms, see supra notes 99-108 and accompanying text.
183. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:2202(3) (stating that entities may include
any enumerated in subsequent part of statute).
184. See id. § 40:2202(3)(a) (defining "group purchaser" as "[e]ntities which
contract for the benefit of their insured, employees, or members such as insurers,
self-funded organizations, Taft-Hartley trusts, or employers who establish or participate in self-funded trusts or programs"); § 40:2202(5) (a) (defining "preferred
provider organization"); § 40:2202(5) (c) ("No licensed provider, other than a hospital, who agrees to the terms and conditions of the preferred provider contract
shall be denied the right to become a preferred provider to offer health services
within the limits of his [or her] license.").
185. See CIGNA Healthplan of La., Inc. v. Louisiana, 82 F.3d 642, 648 (5th
Cir. 1996) (holding that enumeration in statute does constitute grounds for finding that statute relates to plans, so preemption is justified).
186. For a discussion of ERISA's devastating effect on state health care reform
measures, see supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION

Currently, a great need exists for health care reform. 18 7 Because the
federal government has not succeeded in implementing the necessary reforms, the states have taken up the task. 18 8 Many state reform efforts,
however, are blocked by ERISA's broad preemption scheme. 18 9 The
Supreme Court has recently narrowed its interpretation of the preemption
framework to afford states a greater opportunity to exercise their traditional police powers in the area of health care legislation.' 90 In light of
the Supreme Court's direction, the lower courts must continue to narrowly interpret the ERISA preemption language in a way that permits
states to experiment with health care reforms, yet does not betray Congress's original intent in enacting the preemption clause. To do this, the
courts should preempt only those state laws that restrict an ERISA plan's
benefits, structure or administration in violation of ERISA's substantive requirements, rather than unnecessarily expanding the scope of the "relate
to" clause to encompass every state statute that has a remote connection
with an ERISA plan. 19 '
Colleen C. Donnelly
187. For a discussion of the acute need for health care reform in the United

States, see supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
188. For a discussion of state health care reform initiatives, see supra note 7
and accompanying text.
189. For a discussion of how ERISA thwarts state health care reform efforts,
see supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
190. For a discussion of the Travelers decision, see supra notes 80-96 and accompanying text.
191. For a discussion of why the courts should interpret the "relate to" clause
in future preemption cases, see supra notes 146-86 and accompanying text.
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